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Tile role of user charges fox" pul)lic health services has been hotly debat-
ed internationally in the last decade, in both developing and developed
countries. In h’eland, out-patient services and in-patient care in public wards
of public hospitals were provided free of charge to most of tile population up
to 1987. In that year, without little or no prior discussion or debate, charges
for out-patient services and a per-night charge for in-patients in public hosl)i-
tals were introduced, applying to all those who did not qualify for a medical
card on tile basis of a means test.
These charges were increased in early 1993, and the reaction was such
tllat tile Minister for Health set up a review body to examine how they should
be structured, to report I)efore tile 1994 Budget. People who have medical
card cover are also entitled to free General Practitioner services and prescril>
tion medicines, and the question of whether some charge for tllose services
should be imposed Ilas also been raised on occasion (though this is not being
addressed by tile review body).
An exmninatlon of the rationale for policy on user charges in the Irish
public Ilealth services is therefore overdue. This paper considers the argu-
ments as tile), apply in all h’ish context, and assesses tile current structtlre of
charges in that light.
The need to be clem" about what user charges are intended to accomplish
is highlighted. Is the primary objective to conu’ol costs and restrain health
expenditure, discourage unnecessary utilisation, promote efficiency, enhance
equity, or simply raise revenue? The paper looks at each of these possible
objectives, and having assessed the arguments and tile available evidence con-
cludes that the case for charges is for tile most part a weak one.
As far as controlling the growth of health expenditures is concerned,
charges are a bhmt weapon, likely to deter not only "unnecessar)," but also
"necessary" care (which are often difficult to distinguish even with hind-
sight). Total expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP has been success-
fully restrained in the hish case during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This
has I)een brought about through Exchequer control over public spencling,
particularly hospital budgets. The impact this has had on accessibility and
quality of services is not clear, but simply in terms of restraining the growth in
overall health spending Ireland has been particularly successful. Measures to
conu’ol expenditure growth with least impact on the henel]ts fi’om health
care may be best directed at providers and administrators rather than
patients.
Charges can provide an incentive for people to use the health services
more sensibly, in particular to follow the appropriate referral systems rather
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than by-passing primary care to use hospital-based services. The current
structure of charges in Ireland is unlikely to be effective in providing such an
incentive, since those liable to charges still pay substantially more for a GP
consultation than for out-patient services, and those with medical card cover
do not pay for either. If penalising those who go straight to hospital is a cen-
tral objective, then a by-pass fee applying only to those who have not been
appropriately referred (other than gennine emergencies) would suffice.
Charges as currently constituted in Ireland are also unlikely to discourage use
of costly-to-provide hospital in-patient care. In-patient charges win be covered
b), insurance in many cases, and there is also an annual m,’L~zimnm payment,
SO tile patient will very often not have to pay for an additional night. Greater
use of co-payments in insurance (where the insured person bears some of tile
cost) wotdd be required to give an incentive to patients to minimise hospital
stays, but evidence fi’om elsewhere suggests this is not very effective anyway:
decisions about length of stay and choice of in-patient versus out-patient care
are mostly in the hands of the providers and administrators rather than
patients.
Proponents of charges also argne that tile)’ can improve the incentives
facing those providing and delivering health care. Since the revenue raised
by pnblic hospital charges currently goes to the Department of Health, tile
resources available to providers and hospitals are not directly affected and lit-
tle or no impact on their behaviour is to be expected. While allowing hospi-
tals to retain some of tile revenue raised could aher their incentives, this
would not necessarily be in tile direction desired - for example, it could
encottrage maximisation of throtlghput without regard to quality of care.
Incentives for providers can be ahered by changing tile way renlnneration
and hospital budget-setting are structured, whether charges are in place or
not.
From an equity perspective, access to health care is generally regarded as
a basic right, and tile notion that care should be distribltted primarily on the
basis of need rather than ability to pay is widely held. Charges may act as a
barrier to access to care for the poo~, and exempting the poor fi’om charges
via means-testing, as is currently the practice in Ireland, can create other
problems by conu’ibuting to unemployment and poverty traps. Even where
the poor are exempt, charges increase the importance of ability to pay as
opposed to need in determining access to care throughot~t the rest of tile dis-
tribution. Focusing on equity in financing, the view that health care should
be financed primarily on the basis of ability to pay is also widely held. Charges
are probably a regressive way of financing health care even when the poor are
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exempt, and expanding their role is likely to I110ve the financing of health
care in h’eland, which is currentl), mildly progressive, in tile direction of less
progressivity.
h’eland is not in the position of many developing countries, which appear
to have little realistic alternative to user charges if resources for the health
sector are to be mobilised. Here other sources of finance are available, and
the case for an enhanced role for health charges cannot simply rest on the
assertion that they are necessary to l’aise revenue. Insteacl, the costs and bene-
fits associated with ahernative sources of financing public heahh services
have to be assessed. The alternatives include raising additional revenue fi’om
taxation, diverting additional resources to health fi’om other areas of govern-
nlent spending, or improving the way the money currently being devoted to
health care is sl)ent. While there are distortions and welfare losses associated
with taxation or social il]Skll’al)ce, charges also Ii:lve costs in that some "neces-
sary" utilisation of health services will be discouraged, and sick people will
bear a larger slmre of the burden of Iinancing. In this context it is worth
highlighting evidence fi’om h’eland and other counuies which suggests Lhat
there is significant scope lot iml)rovcment in tile way the heahh care system
is structured alld nlanaged and the way the i~esotll’ces devoted to health care
are spent. User charges can in some sense be seen as a "soft option", alleviat-
ing the need to address how to get better value for money in tile public
health services.
The paper thus concludes that on efficiency grounds there may be a case
for a charge on "inappropriate" use of hospital out-patient services by those
who I)y-pass the GP and are not genuine emergencies, altl’~ough non-financial
factors such as GP availability which may influence this choice also need to be
considered. Charges on users of out-patient services who have I)een appropri-
ately referred, and on in-patients, cannot be justified on this basis: tile), are
best seen simply a means of raising revenue, which most be assessed against
the ahernatives. The Exchequer currently forgoes about £45 million per year
in income t~x through the relief granted on health insurance premia. Since
the extension of entitlement to public hosl)ital care to the entire population
with the abolition of Entitlement Category 111 in 1991, the original justifica-
tion for tiffs relief- namely the limited public entitlements of tiffs group - no
longer holds. While this remains in place, it is particularly difficuh, to accept
the argument that user charges are the best or only way to increase the
resources available to the public heahh services.
Chapter I
hVTI’IODUC770N
A central objective of health policy internationally is to promote access to
care for all those who need it. In many countries, developed or developing,
this objective has been i2ursued by ensuring that health services are provided
fi’ee of charge o1" at heavily subsidised prices at point of use for some or all of
the population. In recent years there has been a great deal of debate about
the effectiveness of such a pricing policy for health services, and the issue of
whether or how best to charge for these services has become a "live" one for
policy makers. In a developing country context, this debate has been strongly
influenced by the forthright views expressed by the World Bank that health
services should not, in general, be proviclecl fl’ee, and that efficiency and
equity wotdd both be enhanced by charges. In developed countries wrestling
with the problem of controlling the growth of expenditure on health, the
question of charging for services is now being actively considered even where
this would mark a radical shift, as in Canada. Where charges are ah’eady in
place, changes in their level and structure are often among the options
recently implemented or being actively considered.
In Ireland, out-patient services and in-patient care in (public wards of)
public hospitals were provided fl’ee to most of the population for many years,
up to 1987. Only the 15 per cent or so of the population towards the top of
the income distribution had to pay for these services up to that elate. In 1987,
charges for out-patient services and a per-night charge for in-patients in
public hospitals were introduced, applying to all those not in Entitlement
Category I, that is those who dicl not qualify for a medical card on the basis of
a means test. These charges were increased in early 1993, and the reaction
was such that the Minister lbr Health set up a review body to examine how
they should be structured. People who do have medical card cover are
entitled not only to free hospital care but also fl’ee General Practitioner
services and pi’escription medicines. As public expenditure on providing
these services, particularly the drugs element, continues to rise relatively
rapidly, the issue of whether some charge should be imposed for GP visits
and/or drugs has also been raisecl on occasion - though this is not being
considered by the Minister’s review group. Finall}; very substantial increases
have been implemented in recent years in charges for private
accommodation in public hospitals, most of the impact being on those
insured by the Voluntary Heahla htsurance Board, and questions about how
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much farther this should be pursued also have to be addressed. The basis and
rationale for policy towards charging for public health services therefore
merits re-examination in h-eland, as in many other countries.
The objective of dais paper is to assess the options facing polic),-makers in
this area, in the light of the general arguments, experience and debates
elsewhere, and the specifics of the h’ish situation. In Chapter 2, the current
system of charges for public health services in h+eland is described and put in
the context of pricing policies in the health area followed b), other OECD
counu’ies. Chapter 3 sets out the general arguments advanced for and against
charging for health services, and the factors which must be considered in
designing a system of health charges. Chapter 4 looks at recent trends in
health expenditure and the conu’ibution of charges to laealth financing in
h+eland compared with elsewhere, and assesses how dais affects the case Ibr
charges. Chapter .5 fOCUSeS OO the argttment that charges can promote
economic efficiency, and discusses whether charges as currently su’uctured in
Ireland are likely to enhance efficiency. Chapter 6 deals with equity issues,
looking at the distributional impact of charges within the broader perspective
of equity in the financing and delivery of health services. Chapter 7
sunm)arises the main conclusions.
Chapter 2
THE STRUCTUICE OF HEALTH CHARGES
2. 1 Introduction
This chapter first describes the way in which charges are levied on users
of fiealtla services in Ireland. It then places current h’ish practice in
comparative context by looking at the role which charges play in the heahh
systems of some other OECD countries, as well as recent trends in OECD and
othec countries in this regard. The major issues relating to charges which
need to be addressed are then set out.
2.2 The Structure of Health Charges in h’eland
Entitlements to free or subsidised heahh care in h’eland depend on
income. I The system of entitlement currently in operation distinguishes two
categories: those in Category 1, who have what is commonly termed "medical
card" cover, and those in Category 11, who do not. Families with incomes
below a specified ceiling qualify for a medical card and are entitled to free
General Practitioner (GP) care and prescription medicines, fi’ee out-patient
services in public hospitals, and free in-patient care in public wards of those
hospitals. (Most Irish hospitals are "public" in this sense, in that they are
financed almost entirely by the state, ahhough the), ma)’ be owned and run by
religious orders/charitable trusts, etc., or by regional Health Boards2). Those
who do not meet this means test, on the other hand, generally have to pay
the full cost of GP care and prescription medicines3, and since 1987 they also
have to pay charges for out-patient services in public hospitals and in-patient
stays in public wards of those hospitals. Public hospitals also have semi-prix~te
and private accommodation: those occup),ing semi-private or private beds
have to pay for that accommodation, whether they are in Category 1 or not.
(Those obtaining care in private hospitals have to pay for that care
irrespective of income.)
I A full description of the Irish s)’slem of hcnhh carc cntitlcmenug :rod delivcln, is given ill Nolan
( 1991 ) Ch.~pter 2.
2 A detailed description of the hospilal seclor and the Heahh Board/Vohll~laln//pri~ate hospital mix
is given in Report of the Commission oil Heahh Funding 1987, Chapter 12.
3 There arc, however, scvel~l State schemes, opei,’ated through Ihe Health [~o:u’ds, whcrcb), high or
]~l’oloz~gc¢] cxp,cndhul~ on prescription medicinc.~ o~’cr specified ceilings is covered or reimbul’.~cd,
3
4The way
follows:
(I)
(2)
(3)
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these charges for public health services are currently structured is as
Those outside Category I using out-patient clinics of public
hospitals are charged £6 per visit, with a maxinmm pa),ment per
person of£42 in any 12-month period;
Those outside Category 1 spending time its in-patients in public
wards of public hospitals are charged £20 per night, with a
maximum payment of£200 in any 12-month period;
All those opting for private accommodatioo in a public hospital pay
additional charges. These are currendy £132 per night for a private
bed or £104 for a semi-private one in major public hospitals, with
lower charges for smaller hospitals.
The level and structure of these public hospital out-patient and in-patient
charges has also been altered somewhat since they were introduced in 1987.
At that time, the out-patient charge was £10 for the first visit with a specifc
condition, with subsequent visits for that condition not sul2iect to charge,
whereas now a lower charge is payable but for each visit. The in-patient
charge was introduced at £10 pet" night, with a maximuna of£100 in any year.
To understand the role of these public health service charges, it is
necessary to discuss the way they evolved and the relationship between public
and private provision and financing of health care in h’eland. Those without
medical card covet" have ahvays had to pay privately for GP care and
prescription medicines. The GPs who provide this care and the pharmacists
providing the medicines are independent professionals who also cater for
those with medical cards, for whom they are paid by the General Medical
Service (GMS) Payment Board on behalf of the Department of Health. Since
1989 GPs are reimbursed for their GMS patients on a capitation basis, rather
than the fee-for-service system which operated until then: other patients
continue to pay a fee for each visit. Up to 1987, though, out-patient services
in public hospitals and in-patient care in public wards of those hospitals were
provided fi’ee of charge not only to those with medical card cover but also to
a majority of the remainder of the population.
A three-category entitlement system was in operation at that time, those
without medical card cover being divided into Categories II and 111, again on
the basis of an income ceiling. Those in Category 111, who were above a
specified income ceiling and comprised about 1.5 per cent of the population,
had nauch more limited entitlements than those in what was then the
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intermediate Category 11.4 Up to 1987, people in Category II hacl the same
entitlenlents to free out-patient and in-patient care in pul)lic hospitals as
those with medical card cover. Thus, about 85 pet" cent of tile population
were entided to fi’ee pul)lic hospital care. The remaining 15 per cent were
entided to fi’ee maintenance but were liable for medical consultants’ fees in
the public heahh services. So that those without full public cover could
insure against these cosls, the Voluntary Heahh Insurance Boarcl had been
set up in 1957 hy the state as a monopoly non-profit provider of health
insurance, and most people in Category I11 did have VHI cover. This also
covered the costs of private accommodation in public hospitals or care in
private hospitals anti allowed choice of consultant, and a significant
proportion of those in Category I1 also paid for health insurance despite
their entidement to fi’ee care in public warcls of public hospitals.
The introduction of charges for puhlic hospital services (other than
those for private accommodation) in 1987 was therefore a marked departure
fi’om the policy which had obtainecl up to that date, whereby these services
were providecl fi’ee of charge at point of use to most or the population. The
distinction between those with medical card cover and those without was
greatly reinforced: having applied only to whether one was entided to fi’ee
GP care and associated drugs, the differentiation now extended to
entidement to free care in puhlic hospitals. The entidement structure was
subsequendy altered in 1991. Category I11 was abolished and those who had
heen in that category were now entitled to full public hospital care in a
public ward - subject only to the new charges- rather than maintenance
only. The present structure, then, distinguishes simply between those in
Category 1, who receive GP care and public hospital care fl’ee of charge, and
the remainder of tile population, who pay privately for GP care and are liable
for the charges for public hospital care. CtH-rently, just over one-third of the
population are in Category 1, with medical card cover, so the charges are
payable by almost uvo-thirds of the population.
The role of health insurance remains an important one, both narrowly
with respect to charges and more broadly. It was suggested at the time
,I See Nolan (1991) Chapter 2 Ibr a fldl description of the pre-1991 entitlement s).slelll. It is wordl
noting dlat those in C:ltcgol3’ Ill verstls CalegfH3, II were <llslingtlished on the basis of:m izadivi(Itlal
e;Irllillgs ceiling (where:is Ihe ille:lns test for C:ltcgoi)* I st~lttls relates to I’~llnily il~COlll~ ~nd t~l~eS
family size itlto acCOtlnl). As a result, meml)ership of C:ltegolT Ill did not correspond exactly with
position ill tile JnCOllle (lisll’il)tltion, ,qnd die I~ pel" cent ill I]l~l[ calegolT ~¢en’c not :111 ill the top 15
per cen; in terms of unadjusted .r eqtfi~.’alent |lOUSchold disposable income (see Nolan, 1991, pp.
,17-19).
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Category I11 was abolished that this might reduce tile demand for health
insurance substantially, since that group could now avail of care in public
wards of public hospitals (subject only to the per-night charges). However, as
analysed in Nolan (1991), the limited entitlements of Category 111 did not in
fact appear to be the major element in the demand for health insurance.
Many of those on middle and higher incomes appeared to be willing to pay
for heahh insurance primarily in order to be sure of speedy access to hospital
care, and the stud), concluded that the abolition of Category 111, taken alone,
was unlikely to have much impact on the demand for health insurance." ,,ks
yet the evidence suggests no significant effect on the numbers with VHI
cover: about one-third of the poptdation are currently covered by \q-ll, with a
small increase between 1991 and 1992.6 Their coverage varies depending on
the plan chosen and the premium paid, but all the standard plans include
cover for the public hospital in-patient charges.7 The out-patient charges in
public hospitals are also included under the standard plans but will only be
reimbursed when total expenditure in the year on out-patient care (including
GP visits httt not prescription medicines) exceeds a ceiling, currently £105 for
an individual or £170 for a family when the excess over those amounts will be
covered.
At the time the statutory public hospital charges were introduced in
1987, and in response to concerns about the financial burden they might
impose, the VHI at the Minister for Health’s urging introduced new policies
which allowed people to buy cover for these charges only. Although the
annual premia are low, by 1992 onl), about 10.5,000 people had cover for the
statutory charges only, which is aboul 5 pet" cent of those liable for the
charges and 10 pet" cent of those liable and without \q-ll cover under the
standard plans already.8
In assessing the impact of the public hospital charges, then, the role of
insurance must be noted. The per-night in-patient charges will generally be
5 See Nolan (1991) Chapters 10, I I and 14.
6 The numbers insured under the main VI-II plans rose fi’om 1,165,62,t :it end-February 1991 to
1.193,965 at end-Februnz’y 1992 (VI-II Annl~allCe/,u)rt,~ 1991,1992).
7 That is, if the bospil:d night in question is covered, so is the statutolT pcr-nighl public charge.
8 Initiall),, Ihere were iwo stlch plans - Plall P, which covered the statutolT in-patient :tnd OUl~palielat
charges, and Plan T, which allowed people in Entitlement Category III Io buy cover for public con-
sultant fees :Is well as the st:ltutory charges. Membership of these two plans w;ts 124.000 in 1991,
when the abolition of CategolT 111 and extension of public eligibility for cof*suhant-s fees to the
whole population ma0e Plan T ttnnecess:uT. Son’~e of those enroled ttnder Plan T then joined the
main plans, and men’~bel~hip of Plan P was 105.1,10 :It end-FebrualT 1992 (VI-II Annual I¢~mrts 1991,
1992).
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paid directly by the V[-II for about one-third of the population, and anotlaer
third will I)e exempt because they are in Category I, so these charges will be
paid at point of use I)y only about I in 3 of the population. The out-patient
charges, on tile other hand, will be paid at point of use I)y all those without
medical card covet, and even where the individual has VHI these charges will
ver), often not be reiml)ursed.
The main role of health insurance, thotlgh, remains the coverage of the
costs of obtaining "private" hospital in-patient care: that is, care from a
consultant of one’s choice either in public hospitals - generally though not
always in i)rivate or semi-private accommodation -o1" in private hosl)itals. The
level of the charge made for a private or semi-private bed in i)nblic hospitals
is therefore an important element in the cost of obtaining private in-i)atient
care in these hospitals. There has always been a charge tbr this amenit),, set I)y
the l)epartment of Heahh and al)pl),ing uniformly across all public hospitals,
but for many years it was relatively low. Over tile past decade or so, howeveh
the level has been raised very substantially. From 1980 to 1993, the charge for
a private bed in major public hospitals has risen fi’om £12 to £132 per night,
and that for a semi-private one has risen fi’om £9 to £104.While these charges
rose eleven-fold, over this period consumer prices rose b7 only 125 per cent,
so this represented a very snl)stantial increase in real terms. This has a direct
impact on the VHI and has contril)uted to a shar1) rise in premia, which
increased in nominal terms b), a factor of 3 between 1980 and 1993.
,’Ms the discussion has macle cleat-, tile charges for phi)lie heahh services
must I)e seen in the wider perspective of the role of charges at point of use
and out-of-pocket expenditure in the financing of the heah.h services. "Oub
of-pocket" expenditure here refers to those payments by houselaolds for
health services (whether pul)lic or private) which are not subsequently
reimbursed by an insurer. In Ireland, out-of-pocket expenditure for laealth
care principally goes on:
(I) GP care and prescription medicines For those not in Entitlement
Category I;
(2) public hospital out-patient and in-patient charges for those not in
Entitlement Categor), I and without \rill cover for these charges;
(3) "private" hospital treatment (in public or private hospitals) to the
extent that this is not covered by the VHI;
(4) long-term nursing home care for the elderly not covered I)y VI-II or
Iqealth Boards.
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Such out-of-pocket expenditure accotll]L~ for about 15 pet" cent of current
health spending in the Irish case9. (,’Ms far as the charges for public health
services are concerned, it is worth emphasising that only tile element not
covered by tile VHI will connt as out-of-pocket expenditure in this sense.)
Having set out tile role which charges tbr health services now play in the
Irish system, the remainder of this chapter puts this in a comparative context,
looking at the structure of charges facing users of tile health services and the
importance of out-of-pocket expendittu’e as a source of financing in some
other OECD countries.
2.3 The Ro& of Health Cha~gez" EL~ervhere
Health systems in OECD counuies vary greatly in terms of institutional
structures, the puhlic/priwtte mix in financing and in delivery, and tile role
of social and private insurance, and it is not our objective here to describe
these structures in detail. Instead, we concentrate on tile charges which face
users of the health services at the point of use, and tile role which out-of-
pocket payments play in financing, in a number of these countries.
Perhaps the simplest system in structural terms is one in which charges
play a relatively minor role, tlamely tile UK. Everyone is entitled to free GP
and hospital care under the National Health Service (NHS). There is a flat-
rate charge for prescriptions (which was Stg.£3.05 in 1990), though many
patients are exempt tor a varletT of reasons. There are also charges for dental
and ophthalmic care under the NHS. A relatk,ely small private medical care
sector provides for choice of doctor, speedier access to hospital, and private
hospital accommodation for those who are willing to pay, often covered by
private health insurance. Out-of-pocket payments account for only about 10
per cent of all expenditures on health, and private insurance for only about 5
per cent, the remainder being financed out of general taxation or social
insurance contributions. Major changes in the organisational structure of the
NHS have been iillplemented in recent ),ears which are intended to promote
atJtonomy and efficiency of the component parLs, but no changes have been
made in the way tile service is financed. Health care (mostly) h’ee at point of
use remains a central tenet of the NHS.
Tile health financing su’uctures in other EC menlber states tend to be
much more complex, often based oil a mix of cover by the state, non-profit
sickness funds and private insurance, as well as out-of-pocket payments. In
Belgium and France, for example, patients generally have to pay a
9 See Nolan (1993a).
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proportion of the cost of GP visits and prescription medicines, the remainder
being covered (directly or by reimbnrsing the patient) by health insurance
ftmds or, less fi’equently, private insurers. In both cases, the patient generally
pays 25 per cent of the doctor’s fee, with the long-term ill exempt in France
while widows, the disabled and old age pensioners below an income ceiling
pay lower fees in Belginm.10 For hospital in-patient stays, in France there is a
small per day charge, currently FF60 or about £7 pet" day. In Belgium, there is
a co-payment of a proportion of the fees for the specialist and diagnostic tests
as well as a daily charge of BF221 or about £3.50. In Belgium, reforms aimed
at controlling heahh care expenditure in the late 1980s/early 1990s have
concentrated on the implementation of global bttdgets for various sectors,
with little emphasis on increasing cost-sharing by patients. In France, by
contrast, the extent of cost-sharing has been rising through increased co-
payments and other channels, though the impact has been cushioned by
supplementary insurance for some. Out-of-pocket payments covet" about 17
per cent of total health care expenditure in France and about 12 per cent in
Belgium. I I
In the former West Germany, most of the population is insured on a
compulsory or voluntary basis by sickness funds. Under the statutory
insurance system, patients pay a prescription charge of DM3 and a per-day
hospital charge of DMI0 for the first 14 days, with ceilings on total charges
and exemptions for children and those on low incomes. These were
introduced only in the early 1980s, when they were set at DM2 and DM 5
respectively, and were raised in 1991 as part of cost-containment policy
packages. Out-of-pocket expenditure accounted for about 11 per cent of
heahla expenditure.
The system of heahh financing in The Netherlands is currently in flux,
with a radical reform being implemented following the broad outline of the
recommendations of the Dekker Commission which reported in 1987. Prior
to the reforms, the whole population was vohmtarily or eompnlsorily insured
foz" acute health care costs, a majority with sickness funds and the remainder
with private insurers. The sickness funds generally covered the entire cost of
GP visits and prescription medicines as well as specialist care, whereas people
with private insurance could choose to carry some of the risk themselves.
Out-of-pocket payments accounted for about 11 per cent of heahh care
expenditure. While the Dekker Commission and the modified version of its
10 In I~:)tll COtlntries patlent5 p:ly ;t i]z’oportion of the2 cost of (IZ’tlgs.
11 See Htlrst, 1992, pp. 32, ,17,
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recomnaendatiolas actually I)eing implemented emphasise the importance of
competition and consumer choice, direct charges tire not given an enhanced
role: the basic insurance package continues to cover most health care.
Rather, it is the choice of insurer by the consumer which is seen as the key
competitive lever, and the concentration is on enhancing competition in the
insurance market and among providers of health care. Rising costs will have
their impact on the consumer mainly through the flat-rate element of the
total insurance premiuna which they pay- the remaining risk-related element
effectively heing paid by the state - rather than through increased costs at the
time when c.?.we is needed.
In Denmark central and local tax revenues finance publicly-provided
health care and those receiving GP and hospital care do not face a charge,
though there are co-paynaents for prescription drugs. In Swi~erland, those
with only basic sickness fund covet" pay I 0 per cent of the cost of ambulatory
care. In these countries, out-of-pocket payments account for about 16-18 pet"
cent of total health care spending. In Spain the figure is slightly higher, but
in Portugal, with a less developed public heah.h s),stem, out-of-pocket
payments account for close to 40 per cent of health spending. 12
This is even higher than the level seen in the USA, which is strikingly
different among the richer OECD countries in the extent to which health
care is financed out-of-pocket. In the US case, this expenditure is largely in
the form of co-payments for primary and in-patient care by those with private
insurance and those covered b), Medicare, the national scheme for the
elderl); as well as spending by those without insurance. Rapidly rising health
spending in the US dtu’ing the 1970s and 1980s was attributed by some to the
fact that consumers with insurance did not bear much of the direct cost, and
the response has been to increase the proportion borne by the consul31er
through more extensive use of deductihles, co-insurance and co-pa),ments. (A
deductible is a fixed amount which the consumer must pay before the insurer
pays the excess, and co-instlranee and co-payment involve the consl.lnler
paying a specified proportion of the cost: or a specified amount for a
particular service with the insurer paying the rest.) A~s we will see in the next
chapter, though, health care spending in the US has continued to grow
rapidly. More funclamental reforms are now being considered, with the
extension of health insurance to the endre population and the control of
costs as central aims.
12 Wagst;dl’, x~lla Doorslaer, et aL (1992) p. 369.
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Canada presents an interesting and oft-quoted COlltl’.71sI to tile USA.
There, heahh services charges were abolished in 1972, under tile heahh
insurance s)’stem which is operated b), the provinces but under conditions
mandated at fedeFal level. GP and hosl)ital care has I)een free at point of use,
and tile emphasis in terms of cost conu’ol has been on using the bargaining
power of the i)rovinces as monopol), i)urchasers of health care services from
i)roviders. For many years this al)peared successfld in keeping down the rate
of growth in heahh spending, though more recentl), the record has been
more mixed. As a COllseqtlence of this and ol.her concel’ns, the whole issue of
the role of charges in the health services has re--emerged as a Iopic of debate,
with some provincial governments pressing for their use.
In some though by no means all the OECD counu’ies we have discussed
the reaction of policy-luakers to rapidly increasing health expenditures
inchlded giving a greater role to charges. With the possil)le exception of tile
USA, though, this was not seen as the main i)lank iH the packagcs of health
services reform measures introduced in the various countries duriug tile
1980s and early 1990s. In reforms being iml)lemented in man), developing
COUlltl’ies arotlnd tile same time, however, charging "constlnlel’S" of health
services was given great prominence.
2.4 Conchtsions
Looking at the financing of health care in comparative perspective,
h’eland is not an outlier among OECD counu’ies in the extent of reliance on
out-of-pocket payments. Tile UK is at one extreme with only 10 per cent of
health spending coming fi’om this source and tile USA and Portugal are at
the other with 30 per cent or more, but at 15 per cent tile percentage for
h’eland is similar I.O countries such as France and Denmark.
Likewise, the increased role of charges for users of the pul)lic health
services in the 1980s and 1990s does not mark h’eland out as exceptional.
Some, though by no means all, of the other OECD counu’ies we considered
responded to tile growth in health expenditure by increasing charges at tile
point of use, primarily to discourage "unnecessar)," utilisation. Many
developing countries, urged on by international organisations such as tile
World I?,ank, have also moved to introduce or increase charges for health
services.
This does not necessarily mean that the case for charging For health
services is a convincing one at a general level, of course, nor that charges are
an al)l)rOl)riate resl)onse in the specific circumstances of Ireland. Moving a
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stage further, even if one accepted that charges were appropriate it would still
be necessar), to ask whether the structure of charges adopted in the h’ish case
was likely to promote the desired objectives. In the next chapter we examine
the l,’ationale behind charging for health services and tile case against doing
so at a genera, I level. In the following du’ee chapters we go on to look at how
the balance of arguments weighs up in h’ish circumstances, and how tile
structure of charges currentl), in place can be assessed in the light of these
argtlllle n ts.
Chapter 3
CI4A RGING FOR HEALTH
3. 1 Introduction
Having described tile role which charges currcciLly play in the health
services in Ireland and some other OECD countries, we now discuss the
general arguments for and against cbarging for bealth services and the
factors to I)e taken into account in designing a structure of charges. In
Section 3.2 the general shape of the debate on charging for bealtb care is
outlined, while subsequent sections concentrate on specific aspects, namely
resources and cost corttalnment, efficiency, and equity.
3. 2 Chalgingfor Health Care -The Debate
xAqaether and bow to charge users of healda care bas been a particularly
contentious issue for policy debate in developed and developing counuies
over the past decade or so. In developed countries, nmcb of the pressure for
reform of health care systems has renected a concern about restraining
expenditure levels, with beahh spending as a proportion of GDP on a
sustained upward trend in many counu’ies. In the developing world, although
the costs of health care inputs were also generally rising, tile concern tended
to be more about dae scarcit},, of resources for bealth care given pressure on
public finances and, particularly in Africa, pool" macroeconomic
performance. Tbe case for introducing charges for users of health services oz"
increasing tbe level and widening the scope of such cbarges has focused in
the industrlalised countries primarily on making consumers more cost-
conscious and tbereby discouraging "unnecessary" utilisation, whel’eas in
developing countries tile emphasis has been more on charges as a source of
revenue,
In both cases, proponents have also argued tltat charges hell) to promote
efficiency, while opponents have concentrated mostly on the implications for
the poor and for equit)’. The efficiency arguments for cbarging users flow
from the belief tbat prices not only act as a disincentive to "fi’ivoloos" use,
they can also help to promote use of the appropriate level of care and send
the right signals to providers and planners. Patients are faced with a financial
incentive to act as diligent consumers, searcbing for the "best boy" and
thereb)’ promoting competition antong providers and insurers. These
arguments are often put witbin tile ntore general framework which
emphasises the inefficiencies associated with organisations not sul~ject to tile
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discipline of tile market - though usually acknowledging tile particular
features on both supply and demand sides wbich make the market for beahh
care diffcrent rronl other commodities.
Those who argue against charges, on the other band, while often
disputing the cost. control/resources and efficiency arguments, cmpbasise
Ibe potential impact of charges on tbe poor. Tbey generally take as their
point of departure the ~due judgemenl Ihat health care sbotdd be available
to all and that need rather than means sbottld have primacy, so the
distribution of health care should not be left up to tile market. Charging for
healtb care fi’om this perspective is most likely to discourage utilisation by the
poor, and providing care fi’ee of charge at point of use is the only wa), to
ensure it is available to all. The counter-argument put by those in t’avotw of
charges is that the poor do not in fact "capture" most of the I)enefits fi’om
services provided fi’ee of charge to everyone, and can be exempted fi’om
charges, so that equity can actually be improved by charging non-poor users.
While some of the arguments bare general applicability and are familiar
froln wider debates about the role of the stale versus Ibe market, health care
differs fi’om other commodities in ways that are central to understanding the
debate about charging for care. The key distinguishing features of heahb
care in this context may be briefly described as follows:
(1) Uncertainty about the incidence of illness and the ,~ssociated costs
calls for sharing of risk across the population via some form of
public or private insurance.
(2) Consumers do not have sufficient knowledge on whicb to base
independent rational decisions about tbe nature of tbeir beahh
problems and the care required. The), are heavily dependent on
expert advice fi’om those providing the care, who are therefore in a
position to exert a major influence on denaand.
(3) Market failure is also inherent on the supply side, with restrictions
on entry and on competition between providers, ;rod third-party
payers (tile state, non-profit and for-profit insurers) play a
dominant role in financing health care. In conlbin,qtiorJ with the
weak position or the £onstlnler, this nleatls that the standard
market model with consumer sovereignty and man), competing
sellers does not apply.
(4) Health care is also widely regarded as "differenl" from other
conlnlodities in ethical or normative terms. Access tO health cztre
for those who need it is seen as a basic entitlement, and ensuring
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that everyone has that access is prominent among l.he stated goals
of health policy in many countries. Going further, the notion that
health care ought to be distril)uted according to need rather than
ability to pay appears to command widespread support among
health professionals and the i)ul)lic at large (Wagstaff, van
Doorslaer, el aL, 1992a) though precisely how this is to he
interpreted can be disl)uted. It. is not necessary for present
purposes to delve into the philosophical issues involved or the
distinctions which can be drawn between access to and receipt of
care. It is sufficient to note that health care is regarded in a
different light t.o other commodities, and that there are l)articularly
strong views ahout how it should he disu’ihuted and the role played
by ability to pay.
The {"act that heald~ care has these distinguishing characteristics is common
ground: where those arguing [br and against a major role for charges part
company is on the iml)lications for how tile market J’or heah.h care can and
should "operate. Against dais background, having identified tile main themes
in tile debate about charging for heahh care, we now look at each in more
detail, starting widl cost control and revenue generation.
3.3 Charges, Cost ContTvl and Resource_~
Expenditure on health care as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries
increased fi’om an average ol’ahout ’t pet" cent in 1960 to over 7 per cent by
the mid-1980s. Ii1 some countries that growth was even more pronounced,
with the share oFGDP going on health spending more than doubling in both
h’eland and the USA over that period, fi’om 4 per cent to over 8 per cent in
the hish case and fi’om 5 per cent to over l0 per cent in the US. (These
expenditure trends are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 below.)
Conu’olling the growth in health spending hecame an increasing priority in
many OECD countries, and this led inter alia to scrutiny oie the role of prices
and of insurance. In tile USA, in particular, many economists diagnosed
"ovef-insurance" as an important part of the problem. Because of instil’ante -
whether fi’om private insurers or the state-provided Medicare for the elderly
and Medicaid For the poor - patients frequently bore little of the direct cost
of the heahh care they actually received. While they had to pay indirectly
through insurance premia or taxes when heah.h costs went Ul), this was llOt
sufficient to make them ration their own utilisation.
More "cost sharing" would discourage "unnecessary" or "flivolous" use of
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services and limit the growth in expenditure, it was argued. In the US, this
cost sharing generally took the form of greater use of co-payments and
deductibles in health insurance, both by private insttrers and in Medicare, so
that patients faced a direct financial incentive to minimise their use of
services. Other OECD cotmtries have also been seeking to limit the growth in
health spending, though (as documented in Chapter 4) the problem they
face has not been as severe as in the USA. With covet- against health care risks
generally provided by social insurance funIs or directly by the state, the use
of co-payments/charges has been extended in a number of countries and in
othel-S moves in that direction are under active consideration, as we saw in
Chapter 2. Private heahh insurers elsewhere also generally followed the US
lead.
Controlling the growth in health cave expenditure primarily through
focusing on consumer behaviour faces two main diffictdties, however. Both
relate to the structure of the "market" for health care and the weak position
in which the patient will inevitably be as a consumer, because of what are
generally referred to as "informational asymmetries". Patients are not able to
form an independent.judgenmnt of what their health care needs are, they
must rely on professional advice. As a result, providers of health care play a
crucial role in forming the views of patients on what they should be
demanding. The first implication is that incentives facing providers and
insurers may therefore be more important tban those facing constlll’lers in
terms of influencing expenditure levels. The second is that if people do
respond to financial incentives an¢l reduce their utilisation of health services,
there is no way to be sure that it will be "fl’ivolous" or unnecessary utilisation
which is forgone. That judgement can only be made ex post, on the basis of a
professional assessment, and patients may not be good judges ex aTzle. In the
light of these factors, cost-control policy may be move effective and have
lower cost+s in terms of health outcomes if targeted to’,vards providers and
insurers rather than consumers of health care. This is reflected, for example,
in efforts to control expenditure oo prescription medicines principally
through influencing the prescribing behaviour of doctors.
We look in the next chapter at the extent to which different OECD
countries have been able to control the growth in health spending, in order
to assess the case for charges on that basis. /Ms well as influencing demand,
charges are, of course, a means of raising revenue. Most OECD countries rely
primarily on tax revenue or social insurance contributions (whether to a
cenu’al National Insurance Fund or to sickness funds) for financing health
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care, tile USA being exceptional in the importance of private insnrance. With
public budgets under strain throughout the 1980s and many countries
seeking to reduce their tax I)urdens, "cost sharing" in health, education and
other areas could be one way of shifting part of the burden and casing these
pressures. Whether reducing taxes by increasing such charges improves the
situation or has a largely cosmetic or even negative iml)act depends on
behavioural responses and distributional effects. Reducing the tax burden
wottld in itself be expected to reduce distortions, and people are likely to
respond differently to charges than to taxes, but these responses may
themselves have costs in terms of policy objectives. For example, charging for
primary edttcation or I)rimary health care may make it more dil:ficult to
ellSUl’e that people make use of these services so that targets for education
and health outcomes are more difficult to reach. There will also be
distril)utional implications, first in that those on low incomes may be most
likely to reduce theiu+ utilisation, and secondly in that the distributional
pattern of payments associated with charges will itself differ from that
associated with taxes, l?,oth are discttssed when we come to consider equity in
depth below.
In develol)ing countries, cost conu’ol has tlot been the main concern for
proponents of charges. Rathm; user charges have been seen as offering a way
of mobilising more resources in aggregate for health care and education
(while promoling etTiciency and improving equity). Many developing
cotmtries have attempted to provide health care and edttcation fee of charge,
while others have had only nominal fees for users or have not been assiduous
in collection. I4owevec, in t.he 1980s and into the 1990s the pressures on
i)ul)lic spending in the face of slow economic growth and record budget
deficits have become intense. As a result, ahernative sources of financing for
social services have been sought, and attempts to raise significant revemm
thrOtlgh tlsef charges have heroine much nlore COllllllOI1 ill ho[h health alld
education. The World Bank, which has played an important role in
advocating the use of charges in the socla] sectors, set out its recommended
agenda for relbrm of the financing of health services in developing cotmlries
in 1987. User charges were central to this agenda, and were seen as offering a
way to increase the resources available for government spending on health,
particularly for tile provision of usually underfunded I)ut highly cost-effective
primary health care. The policy has been or is being taken up by many
developing countries, partly as a resuh, of pressure fl’om tile 13ank and other
donors, with varied success so far in terms of n’aising revenue. The key
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difference between developed countries and many developing countries in
this context, however, lies in the capacity to raise revenue through the tax
system. While there may be distortions and welfare costs associated with
t,’Lxatlon, OECD cotmtries do not face such pressing limits on their capacity
to raise revenue for public spending via taxes.
From a resources point o1" view, theft, the context in which t.he debate
about charging for health takes place in develol)ing countries is quite
different to developed countries, where eotastr~lining rather than expanding
the total resotlt’ces devoted to health care is a key objective. However, it~ both
developed and developing countries proponents place much of their
emphasis on the potential of charges to improve efficiency, where very much
the same argumetmts are used in either setting. It is to these eflqcleocy-based
al"gt.tments that we now turn.
3.4 Cha’rge.s and Iifficiency
Where services are provided fi’ee of charge, consumers face no direct
financial incentive to limit their consumption, and allocation methods other
than price have to be used to determine who gets what service and when.
The al)sence of a direct financial penalty for consumption may lead to
"unnecessary" use of the health services, although there will often I)e other
costs associated with use, such as icavel, time costs arid perhaps loss of
earnings. As we have seen, the main difficuhy with using price to discourage
such utilisation is that there can be no presumption that it will be the
unnecessary visits which are discouraged. Defining what is "unnecessary"
utilisation is itself problematic.13 Experts and officials have difficultT defining
in advance, and sometimes even after the event, what is medically necessary,
so it is unreasonable to expect patients to be good judges. The large-scale
controlled experiment carried out by time RAND Corporation in time USA
suggested that user charges were about as likely to deter padents from using
what was judged to be necessary as uonecessary services (LohL et aL, 1986).
Simply fi’om the i)oint of view of efficiency and controlling health costs,
discouraging early treaunent may mean that the care ultimately needed ends
up being more costly to provide. With "ordinary" commodities the consumer
can make a rational informed choice to reduce consumption in the face of
13 Care ~’}lich has some nledic;i] benefit btlt ilot sufl]clent IO otltw.21gh 111,2 coxt_~; can I),2 COllSi{[Cl’ed
"unncces.,;al)", but assessing that benefit - certainly ex ante- is often dit]~cult, and deciding whether it
is tl)e~ ~’.¢orth" the cost is n m:Jtter for politic~l ;rod ethic;JI.j~Jdgen)el~t.~ ~7Jtber tb:Jl~ seJl"~’ide~t (see
Stoddm’t a aL, 1993),
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increased price, posing no problem for public policy. In the case of heahh
care, though,
(a) the consumer may not be in a good position ex ante to assess the
value o[:a visit to the doctor, and
(b) improving the health status of the i)Ol)ulation in a cost-effective way
is an objective of public policy.
I’romoting the use of al)l)ropriate heah.h services, i)articularly primary and
preventive care, has therefore become an iml)ortant i)art of heahla policy,
and this is the context in which "pricing policy" - user charges - have to be
seen.
There are a number of ways, other than discouraging "unnecessary"
ulilisalion, in which it is suggesled that charges could eontril)ute to
improving efficiency, through the signals and incentives they can give to botla
consumers and i)roviders or planners. One of the most important is the role
charges could play in redirecting demand and resource allocation away fi’om
high-cost hospital-based care, i)articularly in-l)atient care, to lower cost and
o[’ten more apl)ropriate primary care. V~qlere no fees are charged, a patient
will have no incentive to use the service that is less costly to i)rovide - the GP
rather than the hospital out-patient department, Ibr example. Most health
budgets are (lominated by tim costs of running hospitals, and countries are
trying to redirect resources towarcls primary care, with an assoclatecl shift in
emphasis towal’ds preventive rather than curative services, a strttcture of
charges which reflects the relative costs of providing different types of
services will signal patients Io ration their use of expensive resources - as the
World Bank put it: "Consumers will be more sensible in their demand for
services".14 Particular emphasis is placed on the potential to encourage the
prol)er use of referral systems. Charges can give patients an incentive to seek
care first at the lowest level - the health centre or GP - rather than going
straight to hospital, as frequently happens where both are free of charge.
They can also i)rovide an incentive for i)atients to spencl as little time as
possible as an in-patielat, for example, helping to promote the use of day-
surgery.
Whether charges actually do help to i)roduce the desired redirection of
demand towards primary care depends on how they are structured, and
equally importantly whether the patient or a thircl [)arty ends up paying
thelll. The structure of charges in place in many countries does not in Fact
1’t World Bank (1987) p. 26.
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provide a disincentive to bypassing the primary level, or the difference in the
level of the fee is not sufficient to outweigh what are seen to be other
advantages of going straight to hosl)ital, sttch as availability or quality of care
provided. Further, it can often be the case that insurance offsets the
incentives built into the structure of charges. It is common, for example, for
patients to have to pay for out-patient costs themselves (or to be covered by
insurance only al)ove a relatively high deductible), but to be covered fully for
in-patient care. FurtheL it is generally overlooked in presenting the case for
charges along these lines that use of the referral system could be promoted
simply by charges levied only on those who I)ypass the primary level. Neither
charges at primary level itsell, nor at hospital level for those who .qre referred
ttpwards from primary level, would be required to produce tlae desired
incentive. Those arguing in favour of charges also emphasise the role of
prices as an efficient method of allocation, v~qaere services are provided free
of charge, there has to he some alternative method for allocation of the
service, and, where demand exceeds supply, for rationing. Proponents see
price as a i11oz’e eMcient mechanism for allocation than, for example,
queueing. Critics of free health services such as tllose in the UK and Canada
thus highlight the existence of queues for doctors or out-patient clinics and
sometimes lengthy waiting lists for particular types of hospital in-patient
treatment. Leaving aside for the moment the obvious eqnit), implications of
allocating health care using price, the assumption tlaat this will he more
efficient than alternative naechanisms depends on what one means by
efficient and what it is that one is seeking to maximise. If, for example, the
aim is to produce the greatest impact on ill-health possible with the resources
awtilable, then efficiency would involve allocating care first to those who can
benefit most. A queueing pt’oceclttt’e wlaich ranked people on the basis of
condition and severity and allowed those who could benefit most to receive
care first would then be more efficient than allocation using price and ability
to pay. This is not to say that queues and hospital waiting lists actually operate
in that way and achieve that objective: again, though, it is fat" fi-om self
evident that prices would be a more efficient allocation mechanism in this
sense.
On the supply side, it is also argned that providers will be more
responsive to the concerns and needs of patients where the latter are paying
for the service. The revenue raised via charges can also be used to give
providers or administrators an incentive to provide good care. Whether fees
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can :aclually produce Lhese efl’ect~+:. clearly del)ends on what hal)pens Io Lhe
revenue. If charges for users of I)ublic health services are simply passed on to
the central adnfinistration or to the Exchequer, then neither providers
themseh,es, nor administralors at hospital or facility level, will be directly
affected by their imposition. It may be that patients will thenlselves I)e more
assertive and demanding if they are paying, but tiffs is a rather tenuous basis
for a supply-side response. Providers and administrators may be expected to
respond rather more if at least some of the revenue raised goes to iml)roving
either their own remuneration or working conditions, or the service they can
provide. Precisely how this is structured is crucial. It can be, for examl)le
, 
that
the incentive created for providers or hospitals is to maximise numbers
u’eated rather than impFove quality of care or rechlce cosl~s. A great deal of
the effort to cono’ol health spending in OECD COUl"u.ries has concenu’ated on
designing reimlgursement naechanisms for i)roviders which build in the
"right" incentives, focusing mostly on the relationship with third-party payers
(inchtding the state) rather than the i)atient. It is not clear that expanding
the role of charges is a necessary part of this process, while it. is certainly not a
sufficient one in that- depending on hmv the revenue is distributed-
charges could leave these incentives unchanged or even worsen them fi’om
an efficiency and cost control point of view.
3.5 Chmges and Equity
Resistance to the adoption or expansion of charges for users of public
health services has been so pronotmced primarily I)ecause of concerns about
their equity effects. The debate has generated so much heat because many
people hold very strong views about the importance of health care I)eing
availal)le to those who need it. The main concern is that charges will act as a
barrier to access for Ihose on low incomes, so that some i)eople who need
care will be torced to do without. A related but broader issue is whether, even
if everyone had access to "adequate" health care, those with more resources
should be in a position to obtain speedier u-eatment or better qualit), care.
Finall),, financing health care through charges is regarded by some people as
less fair than financing tlarough taxation, where an individual’s or family’s
conoibution can be related to ability to pay.
While clemand for health care is generally found to be relatively price-
inelastic, the fact that user fees can discourage utilisation by the poor is
acknowledged as a serious problem by those who advocate them. The usual
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response is that the poor can be charged lower fees or exempted entirel),.
Thus the World I?,ank, for example, in arguing for charges emph~sizes tile
need to safeguard the pool’, and suggests that differential fees and/or
exemptions be used. Distinguishing the poor in administering charges poses
major dil’ficuhies in developing countries, much greater tlaan in developed
ones where nteans-testing is already widespread. Wbile there can be
administrative problems, in developed countries it is Ihe impacl of means-
testing on incentives which has become a maior issue in recent ),ears. A great
deal of attention has been paid to the possibility that where social secttrity
cash transfers and perhaps also assistance with housing or other needs are
targeted on a naeans-tested basis, tile incentive to take tip emplo}qllelat or to
work barder can be eroded, leading to unemplo),ment and povert)’ "traps".
Introducing charges for heahh services (or educatiot~) togedter with means-
based exemptions will exacerbate these problems, whereas much of the efforl
in reforming tax and social security s),stems eurrentl), is directed towards
improving work incentives.
More broadly, equit), concerns abottt access to heahh care and the
distribtttion of care do not corieelaLrate simply on the position of tile pool;
The notion that heahh care is a basic right that should be available fi’ee of
charge to all has been quite a wiclel),-held one - indeed some countries have
it enshrined in their constitutions. The related idea that heahb care should
be available on the basis of need rather than ability to pay is also commonly
found it’J policy statements, etc. Whetlaer that necessaril), entails providing
services fi’ee of charge can be disputed, but it is in some senses even more
dematading: from dais perspective it would be regarded as i,aeqnitable if the
rich got mttch speedier access to care or much better care than I.he rest of Lhe
population, even if care were available to everyone free of charge. Widaout
wishing to get embroiled in debates about precisely what policy-makers
actually mean when they talk in terms of care being awtilable to all on the
basis of need, the fact that this is a fundamental objective of heahh policy
forms a cenu’al part of the background against which the role of user charges
is debated.
Those advocating the use of charges in developing cottnu’ies argue that
they would in fact help to improve equit}; since a great deal of the benefit
from fi’ee services actually goes to the non-poor. This is particularly the case
where much of public beahh spending goes on hospitals fl’om which the
urban population, generally better off than those in rural areas, get most of
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the benefit. Even in a developed countr), context, it is argued that tile well-off
capture much of tile benefit from fi’ee services and that charging the non-
poor would allow better targeting of public spending towards the pool’. These
arguments ate familiar from long-running debates about whether social
security transfers should be better targeted on the pool" and, if so, whether
this is best accomplislaed by means-testing. While more equitably distributed
than in many developing countries, a good deal of the benefit fi’om public
heah:h spending in OECD countries does go to middle income groups (as
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 below). Even apart fi’om the incentive
problems created by means-testing itself which have already been mentioned,
though, it may be questioned whether charging tile non-poor is tile most
effective way to re-target public expenditure. If the objective is to encourage
the rich to use private health care instead of public services, the result may be
to promote a two-tier system. As already noted, this might be considered
inequitable even if the rich pay Fully for the better care they receive, and the
side-effect may be to erode public support for the public system, where
standards may suFFer without the "sharp elbows of tile middle classes" to keep
up tile pressure for a good and well-resourced service. If the objective is
simply to raise resources for health spending fi’om tile non-poor via charges
while keeping them within the public system, then at least in a developed
cottntry context there al’e alternative i’evel]ue SOtll’Ces which may be
prefcrred fi’om an equity point of view.
The other concern fi’om an equity point of view of shifting some of the
financing of health care From taxes to charges is precisely that tile
distribution of payments may be more regressive. Precisely how the
distribution of charges compares with taxation depends on the structure of
the charges, who uses the service in question, and what tile tax alternative is.
Flat-rate charges on services uses by people throughout the income
distribution (even with exemptions for tile poor) will generally be regressive,
while income taxes or pay-related social insurance contributions will
generally be progressive. Other taxes will not, though, and charges on
services used mostly by the rich may turn out to be progressive. The
distributional eFFects of shifting fl’om taxes to charges therefore depends on
precisely what is involved in a particular case. Once again, tile view that
health care should be available on the basis of need but financed on the basis
of ability to pay is a widely-held one often reflected in policy statements, and
the role of charges has to be seen in that light.
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3. 6 Concbl.~ions
This chapter has outlined the issues and argumenus which have featured
in the debate about the role of user charges in the health services. Those
arguing for an expanded role for charges point to ways in which they can
contribute to controlling health expenditures, mol)ilising resources for
health, i)romoting efficiency and improving eqtfity. Opponents see charges as
ineffective in controlling expenditure and promoting efficienc); and likely to
raise resources in an ineqtfitable way while reducing the access of the poor to
health services. Adjudicating between these argunaents at a general level
would be an over-ambitious task, and in any case reaching a judgement may
often depend on the specifics of the setting involved. The rest of this paper
concentrates on assessing the use of health services charges in h’eland, using
the framework in which the arguments have been presented in this chapter.
Thus, Chapter 4 discusses expenditure control and resources mobilisation,
Chapter 5 deals with efficient),, and Chapter 6 discusses equity aspects of
health services charges in h’eland.
Chapter 4
HEALTI-I EXI’F~NIklTURI~ AND I;INANChVG IN II’ll~’l_,tArD
4. I h~tTvduclion
In this chapter tile level of expenditure on health services in h’eland and
the financing of that expenditure are examined, and the role of charges
assessed from a financing and expenditure containment perspective. Sectio~
4.2 looks at the evolution of the overall level of expenditure on health care
and of private versus public expenditure. Section 4.3 deals with the financing
"of expenditttre on health, including the contribution currently made by
charges for health care in financing public spending.
4.2 E.~J~e~ditu~e oTt Health Care
It is now possible to analyse h’eland’s health expenditure in comparative
context, thanks to the work done in recent )’ears at the OECD in constructing
a database on health slgending and health systems for 24 member countries.
In this database, health spending is measured using National Accounts
conventions in order to promote cross-country comparability.15 Using this
source we see that in 1980, expenditure on heahh care in h’eland came to 9.2
per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As Table 4.1 shows, this was
among the highest percentages going on heahh in the OECD countries at
that time, and was well above the average for these countries, which was 7.0
per cent. Indeed, the Irish figure was identical to that for the USA, now
viewed as the arclaet),pal "higla-sl)ending" country in the health care context.
I-leahh spending had grown relatively rapidly in Ireland during the 1960s and
particularly the 1970s, rising fi’om 4 per cent of GDP in 1960 to 5.6 per cent
in 1970 and then accelerating to reach 8 per cent by 1975 and 9.2 per cent by
1980.16
15 For IhaI i’c;lson, I]lc [Igtll’es prescIltcd by the OECI) are not identical to those given in Ihe
l)cparlnlent of Hcalth’s annual Health Statistics, which follows the Comnlission q’~n Health Funding
in using departmental expenditul~: 1~lthcr Ih;lll National Accottllts ligttr~. The diN~rcncc2s between
1he two and ;heir reconciliation are discussed in Nol:m (1991, Chapter 2).
16 The most recent ligurc~ published by the OECD sho~’ ~ higher level of he:dth expendittu’e in
Ireland fi’onl 1980 on th:ln did earlier versions, oil which the discussion of h’cland’s relative position
in Nolan 11991. Chaplet 21 relied. This reflects recent revisions to the Irish Nalional Accounus
~slln~ltcs by the C.clltl~tl Stati~llc.s Oflicc.
25
26 CHARGING FOR I’UBLIC I-II.~,\LTH SERVICES IN IREI~’\ND
Table 4. I : Health Expenditure As a I’e~’centage of GDP in OECI) CountrieA~, 1960-1991
Country 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1991
Ausu’alia 4.9 5.7 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.6
Austria 4.4 5.5 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.4
Belgium 3.4 4.1 6.7 7.4 7.6 7.9
Canada 5.5 7.1 7.4 8.5 9.5 10.1
Denmark 3.6 6.1 6.8 6.3 6.3 6.5
Finland 4.2 5.7 6.5 7.2 7.8 8.9
France 4.2 5.8 7.6 8.5 8.8 9.1
Germany 4.8 5.9 8.4 8.7 8.3 8.5
Greece 2.9 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.4 5.2
Iceland 3.5 5.2 6.5 7.1 8.3 8.4
Ireland 4.0 5.6 9.2 8.2 7.0 7.3
haly 3.6 5.2 6.9 7.0 8.1 8.3
japan 2.9 4.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.6
Luxembourg 4.1 6.8 6.8 7.2 7.2
Netherlands 3.9 6.0 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.3
New Zealand 4.3 5.2 7.2 6.6 7.2 7.6
Norway 3.3 5.0 6.6 6.4 7.4 7.6
Portugal 3.1 5.9 7.0 6.7 6.8
Spain 1.5 3.7 5.6 5.7 6.6 6.7
Sweden 4.7 7.2 9.4 8.8 8.6 8.6
Swi~erland 3.3 5.2 7.3 7.6 7.8 7.9
Turkey 4.0 2.8 4.0 4.0
UK 3.9 4.5 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.6
United States 5.3 7.4 9.2 10.5 12.4 13.4
Average 7.0 7.2 7.6 7.8
Source: O ECD (1993) Vol. I, Table 4.1.1, p. 108 and Vol. 11, Table AI.2.4, p. 34.
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¯ ~ks Tahle 4.1 also shows, a remarkable tttrn-around took place between
1980 and 1990 in the evolution of h’eland’s heahh spending, which is
particularly su’iking in comparative terms. By 1990, h’ish health spending had
fallen to only 7 per cent of GDP. This was now considerably lower than the
average for the OECD countries, which had risen to 7.6 per cent. Indeed,
h’eland was one of only four OECD countries which saw health spending
decline as a percentage of GDP over the decade, and the fall in the Irish case
was by far the largest. The USA, by contrast, which started the decade with
the same relatively high level of health spending (as a percentage oF GDP) as
Ireland, saw a continued climb to over 12 per cent by 1990, by far the highest
level in the OECD. While most other OECD countries were much more
successful than the US in curbing the growth of heahh spending as a
percentage of GDP in the 1980s, h’eland is unique in the extent to which
growth was actually reversed.17 ha 1991 Irish health spending rose to 7.3 per
cent of GDP, but remained substantially below the average for the ’24
countries.
Although the population grew relatively slowly, health spending per
capita therefore rose a good deal less in h’eland than in most other OECD
connu’ies in the 1980s. Table 4.2 shows health spending per capita in each
country, converted to a common basis (using purchasing power parities
rather than exchange rates). In 1980, health spending pet" capita in Ireland
was 78 per cent of the average for the OECD countries. On the basis of a
simple cross-section equation relating pet" capita health spending to per
capita GDP estimated for the 24 countries for that },ear, Ireland’s actual
health spending was about one-third higher than would be predicted. By
1990, h’ish health spending per capita had fallen to 66 per cent of the OECD
average and was fourth-lowest of the counu’ies covered, corresponding to
h’eland’s rank by GDP per capita. Health spending per head in h’eland was
now only slightly above the level which would be predicted for a counu’y with
17 For colnpal~|tive put’poses, tht: level of health .spell(lJllg is most oftetl expl’e&~ed iLq a percentage of
GDP, the pntctice adopted here and in earlier OECD analyses. The most recent OECI) publication
( 1993, Chapter 1 ) I~Jcuscs on health expenditure :LS a percentage of total domestic expenditure (TDE),
on the grounds that using an expenditure aggreb~tte in both nunaenttor and denomitmtor increases
consistency. For Irel:md, health :is a percentage of TI)E ~,’as 8.1 per cent in 1980 and 7.6 pet" cent in
1990, so the decline is less pronounced than when GI)P is used. However, over the decade Ireland still
moved from well al×~ve avcl~lge to below avcl’age ill the proportion of spending going on health.
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that GDP.18 In 1991, the h’ish ligure was 70 pet" cent of the OECD average,
still close to that "expected" simply on the basis of GDP per capita.
An analysis of trends in health expenditure in the 24 countries fi’om 1980
to 1990 presented in OECD(1993) decomposes the observed changes into
price and volume components. This reveals that in h’eland over that period,
prices continued to increase more rapidly ill the health sector than elsewhere
in the econonly, as seas tile case in most of the other CotlntFies. However t]lel’e
was volume growth in the health sector - what the OECD study fez’ms "health
care benefits volume growth"- ill all tile other countries, but in h’eland there
was a fall in volume.19 Many of the other countries saw the rate of growth in
volume decline ill the 1980s compared with the 1960s and particularly tile
1970s, but none saw a fall in volume. This analysis is dependent on tile quality
of the measures of price changes (since volume change is determined
residually) and available indices for price trends ill health care are of variable
quality and coverage, but the general pattern is probably reliable. This
finding for h’eland is by no means unambiguously "good news" - fi’om the
point of view of the consumer of health care restraining total expenditure via
price rather than voltlme of care would of course be preferable. This
highlights the limitations of an exclusive focus on restraining expenditure
growth, since this may be achieved only at tile cost of a decline in the
quantity and/or quality of services. Simply from the point of view of
controlling total expenditure growth, however, h’eland’s experience ill tile
1980s stands out.
18 The estimated equation is given in Schiel)er, I’oullicr and Grecn~dd (1992) p. 6. The actual level of
health spending per capita in Ireland in I~0 ~’as 3.5 per cent above th:ll predicted by the eqtnation fi~r
that year. From OECD ( 1993, Chapter I) it can I)c seen that similar conclusions apply when the analysis
is carried out using total domestic expenditure i’alher than GDP .as the independent ~,’ariablc.
19 See OECD ( 1993 I, Table 2. p. 23.
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Table 4.2: Health l-x~Oenditure Pet" Capita in US$ in OECD Cou.ntTies, 1960-1991
Country 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1991
Australia 99 207 663 998 1310 1407
Austria 69 163 683 984 1383 1448
Belgium 55 128 571 879 1242 1377
Canada 109 253 743 1244 181 I 1915
Den mark 70 212 582 807 1051 I 151
Finland 57 164 517 855 1291 1426
France 75 203 698 1083 1528 1650
Germany 98 216 811 I 175 1522 1659
Greece 16 58 184 282 400 404
Iceland 53 137 581 889 1379 1447
h’eland 38 97 449 ’ 572 748 845
Italy 51 153 571 814 1296 1408
Japan 27 127 517 792 I 175 1267
Luxembourg .. 154 632 930 1392 1494
Netherlands 74 207 696 931 1286 1360
New Zealand 94 180 562 747 970 1050
Norway 49 134 549 846 1193 1305
Portugal .. 46 238 398 554 624
Spain 14 82 325 452 774 848
Sweden 94 271 855 1150 1455 1443
Switzerland 96 268 839 1224 1640 1713
Turkey .. 64 66 133 142
U K 79 147 458 685 985 1043
United States 143 346 1063 1711 2600 2867
Average 577 855 1124 1213
Source:OECD (1993) vol. 11, Table A2.1.2, p. 67.
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Breaking down total h’ish health exl)enditure into public and private
elements using the OECD figures, these show contrasting trends in the
relationship between the two over the decades fi’om 1960. In the 1960s,
public heahh expenditure grew a good deal more rapidly than private
expenditure. In the 1970s, both grew at almost exactly the same pace. In the
1980s, priwlte heahh spending grew a good deal more rapidl),. Wilile the
public element has been dominant throttghout, then, the private share has
fhtctuated somewhat, falling fi’om about one<luarter in 1960 to 18 per cent
in 1970, and rising fi’om that level in 1980 back ttp to about one-quarter in
1990 and 1991. At three-quarters of the total, the share of public health
spending in Ireland was then very close to the average for the 24 OECD
cotlntrles.20
This comparative analysis of h-eland’s health spending points to some
important conclusions in considering the structure of financing and the role
of health charges. Controlling the growth of health expenditure has posed
major challenges across all the OECD countries in recent decades, but some
countries have been more successful than others in dais respect. "v%qaile the
relationships are complex, the way health spending is financed is clearly a
crucial factor. Assessing the performance of the h’ish system simply in terms
of its ability to control the growth of expenditure, one would have to
conclude fi’om the experience of the 1980s that this objective was achieved.
Indeed, in comparative terms the size of the fall in heahh spending as a
proportion of GDP makes h’eland exceptionally successful in these terms.
The scope of charges for public health services was significantly widened in
the 1980s, as described in Chapter 2, but this does not appear to have played
a major role in curbing expenditure. Rather, that success can be atuil)uted
primarily to central government control of the Exchequer allocation to
health through the budgetary process, and the dominance of that source in
20 Care mtlst be exercised with dzlt;i on this ptd)lic/pri~-ate dislinclion. In constructing the h’ish
N:llional Accounts figures, expenditure oll prescriptioJl medicines trader tile General Medical
Service for those covered b)’ medical cards is counted as ptffuate health spending, although the
individttnls ittw)lved do not p:ly (the GMS (Payments) Board reimburses i)harm;tcists directly),
because Ihe individunl does have the freedom to choose where to make the ptlrchase. It" other
countries t~)llow this NaliOn~d Accounting collVelltiOll thel} tile CI’OSS<OUlILI~’ COml)al’isons tlSillg
OECD Iqgul’eS .ql’~ on a consistei]l I)ll$is. Ho’.~’ever. Ihe Colnt]liSslon Oll Hc:idth Ftlndlng and the
I)cpartnlent of Health have adopted what wotlIcl appeal" tile 111oi’c (lI)viOtlS pl’OCeCItlre and c}:lssify
this expenditure as public i~tther than pri~’~lte. On Ih:lt basis, Health Statistic~ 1991 shows pi’i~qlte
he:dth spending increasing from about 17 per cent (~1" tot:d current laealth spending in 1980 Io 23
per cent in 1990, falling afffin to 21.6 per cent in 1991. The OECD figures show pri~lte spending :it
25 per cent of total hcahh spending in 1990 and 24 per cent in 1991.
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total I’Lealth expenditure. Using budgetary rather I.han Natiot’~al Accounts
classifications, current government health expenditure fell fi-om 7.3 per cent
of GNP in 1980 to 5.9 per cent in 1989, with much of the decline registered
in the years 1987-89. The key element was spending on general hos]:fitals,
which accounts for :ahout half of current government Ilcahh services
expenditure, and which fell in real terms21 by 7 pet" cent between 1980 and
1986 and by a further.9 per cent between 1986 and 1989 (see Callan and
Nolan 1992). This was associated with a sharp decline in the number of
hospital heds and a smaller fall in the number of in-patients treated as the
average length of stay also [’ell. Expenditure on psychiatric hospitals fell in
nominal terms between 1986 and 1989, and was the other area most affected.
By contrast, expenditure on the "demand-driven" General Medical Service,
providing fi’ee GP care and prescription medicines to those with medical card
covet, grew relatively rapidly, particularly between 1986 and 1989. While the
charges introduced in 1987 coulcl have hacl some impact o;1 dernand, it is
supply-sicle factors which appear to dominate pul)lic hospital spending. The
t½1ct that the central Exchequer was able to exert control over the hudgetary
allocation to public hospitals thus appears to have been the key element in
restraining public health spending.
The implications of these trends for the use of charges to conltrol
utilisation and expencliture will be taken up after the current structure of
financing and the contrihution of charges has been described.
4.3 The Financing of EaJJenditur~; on Health
l:’ublic expenditure on health services in Ireland is financed
i~l’edominantly out of general tax revenues. The precise breakdown of
financing sources del{ends on how public health spending is itself defined
anti measured. As discussed in Nolan (1991), the coverage of the series on
health expenditure published by the Department of Heahh and in the
Estimates of Receipts and Expenditures differs h’om the National AccountS.22
In particular, some cash transfers administered by the Department of ]-Iealth
are includecl in the clel~artmental figures but excludecl in the National
Accounts. Further, the figures for the breakdown of sources of finance
i:~ublished by the Department of ]-]ealth refer to expel’~ditul"e net of income
fi’om charges and ol.her income accruing.23
21 Here lilt2 gcnetzd govczrnlll~2n[ ~Np~21"tditlll’¢2 dcfl~tof IS II$cd,
22 The differences in definition between the series are described in Nolan (1991)
Chapter 2, pp. 23-27.
23 See, for example, Health Statistics 1991, Table J2.
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Excluding cash transfer schemes administered by tile Depat’tment of
Health but not properly health sl)ending
, 
and focusing on gross current
expenditure, the sources of financing of public health spending ill 1991 are
(estimated) as follows:
Exchequer
Heahh contributions, etc.
Receipts under EC regulations
Charges and other income
%
81.4
8.8
2.5
7.3
Tile Exchequer - that is, revenue raised throttgh general taxation - clearly
dominates, accounting for over 80 per cent of public health spending. Health
contributions, raised through the health levy which operates alongside the
system of social insttt-ance contributions, account for abotH 9 per cent.
Charges for health services - inchtding those for maintenance in prix-ate or
semi-private accommodation in i)ublic hosl)itals - are a relatively minor
source of finance. Taken together with some other sources of income lot" the
Department of Health such as deductions from pay for emolun~ents and
supel’antltlation, canteen and other receipts, and inveslnlent income tile),
accounted for about 7 pet" cent of total current ptd)lic health spending in
1991. Charges for private and semi-private accommodation make up about 40
per cent of that figure, so charges for i)ublic hospital services per se and the
other SOtll’Ces mentioned COllie tO only at)out 4.5 per cent.
As the discussion in Chapter 2 emphasised, these charges for public
health services are sometimes paid out-of-pocket and sometimes covered by
health insurance. Looking at all out-of-pocket pa),ments by households for
heahh services (whether public or private) which are not sttbsequently
reimbursed I)), an insttre~, we saw that these account for about 15 per cent of
total (pul)lic plus private) current health spending in the hish case24. As well
as the public hospital charges not covered by insurance, this includes GP care
and prescription medicines for those not in Entitlenlent Category 1,
treatment in private hospitals, and long-term nursing home care, where these
are not covered by tile VHI.
2,t See Nolan (1993a).
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4.4 hnplicalions
Wc Ilave seen tllat charges for public health services currently make only
a small contribulion to financing public health spending in h’eland. From
tile point of view of mobilising resources for heahh, then, public heahh
charges at their current levels play a very nlinor role. To become an
important source of revenue, they would have to be substantially raised and
extended in scope. From a resources perspective, alternatives exist which
spread tile but’den of financing 111uch more widely - most obviously, either
general taxation or tile health contribution which operates alongside tile
systeln of social insurance contrlbutioils. There are, of course, costs
associated witil ]’aising revenue I:rotn those sources, and these have to be
taken into account in weighing up the COSLS and benefits of alternatk,e modes
of financing. Howevel; Ireland, like other OEGD countries, is far fi’om tile
situation of many developing eounu’ies where the revenue-raising capacity of
the tax or social insurance (where it exists) systems are in doubt. "[’lie case for
an enhanced role for health charges iit h’eland calanot rely simply oil tile
need to raise resources: there illust be clear advantages over tile alternative
sotll’ces of []nancing.
Olle or the main advalltages posited for heahh charges in developed
courltries, however, is that tile), discoul’agc "unnecessary" ulilisation of health
services and I.herel)y contribute to controlling tile growth of heahh
expenditure. This can be assessed in the light of tills chapter’s analysis of
heahh expenditure and financing. Controlling tile growth of health
expenditure has posed major challenges in OECD countries in recent
decades. Tile analysis of trends in Ireland’s health spending compared with
other OECD countries has shown that, since tile early 1980s, tile h’ish system
has been exceptionally success[’ul simply in terms of its abilit), to control tile
growth of expenditure as a percemage of national inconle. That success call
be altrlbuted i)rimaril), to cenl.ral governnlent conlrol of tile Exchequer
allocation to health through the budgetary process, and the donlinance of
that source in total heahh expenditure. *ks the UK experience has shown,
where tile Exchequer is the donain:lnt source of financing and tight central
control can be exercised over tile budgetary allocation to health, charges are
not a sine qua non for expenditure control. Conversely the experience of the
USA has shown that even the extensive and increasing use of co-paynlents for
constllnel’s is not in itself sufl]cient to restrain the growth or heahh care
spending as a proportion of national income. (Heahh spending might have
grown even more rapidly ill tile USA without an expansion in charges: tile
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point being made is that charges are neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for restraining expenditure growth.) Controlling expenditure
growth is clearly a very limited goal, and success could be at the expense of
the awfilability and qnality of health care, so a mucb broader perspective and
above all an emphasis on obtaining the maxinauna benefit fi’om what is spent
on health is required. Given the technological, demographic and other
pressttres on heahb spending, though, controlling l.otal expenditure will
remain an important ol~iective.
While Exchequer control over public health spending has been the key
to success in restraining the growth in heahh expenditure in Ireland, it is
notewortby that public bealtb spending on prescription medicines for people
with medical card cover continued to grow rapidly in the late 1980s and early
1990s: precisely the area where departmental expenditure was determined by
the extent of ntilisation rather tban tile other way around. Meastn’es to
control this growth have focused on the behaviour of doctors rather than
patients. First the reimbtwsement system for GPs treating medical card
patients was cbanged from a fee-for-service to a capitation basis, and
subsequently strenuous efforts have been made to persuade doctors to aher
prescribing habits, increasingly by offcring them financial incentives to do so.
The introduction of drug charges fi)r medical card patients has also been
proposed on occasion, thottgh it is not clear if it has been seriously
considered as a policy option. Given that low income households are
invoh,ed, such a charge would presumably not reflect the fnll cost but could
take the form of either a fiat-rate fee per prescription item or a proportion of
the cost, the latter being more appropriate fi’om the point of view of
encouraging patients to use less costly drngs. However, apart fi’om concerns
about equity, experience elsewhere suggests that this would be unlikely in
itself to have the desired impact on prescribing and drugs expenditure.25
Because of tbe nature of health care and the market for health services,
prices may be a particularly ineffective way to constrain demand. Consunaers
rely on professionals to advise them about the care tbey "need", and can
often pass on charges to third-party payers. ~qaere charges cannot be passed
on and do discourage utilisation, the short-term saving may be associated
with higher costs in the longer term for the bealth care system, as some
people delay seeking care and need more expensive treatment when they
finally do so.
25 See, for cxample, Birch (1991).
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It is perhaps for these reasons that some advocates of user charges Iov
health are now concentrating even more than heretofore oil the ways in
which charges can contribute to improving efficiency, rather than resources
mobilisation or expenditure control. We go on in the next chapter to
consider these efficiency arguments as they apply in the h’ish case.
Chapter 5
HEALTH CHARGES AND I~:FICIENCY IN II~I£I~ND
5. 1 hztroduction
Tiffs chapter considers the way charges for public heahh services operate
in Ireland fl’om the point of view of promoting efficiency. This involves
assessing their structure to see whether it is likely to produce the efficiency
gains seen by advocates of charges as a key potential coniribution. We deal
first with efficiency from the point of view of promoting use of the
appropriate type and level of care, and then with the impact on health
services providers.
5.2 Cha~ges and Efficiency in Use of Heallh Services
As set out in detail in Chapter 3, it is suggested by proponents that- in
addition to discouraging "unnecessary" utilisation - charges can make a
m~uor contribution to efficiency by promoting use of the appropriate level
and lype of care. Where care is fi-ee of charge, it is argned, all too often
people seek care first not at the primary level but at hospital ont-patient and
casualty departments. Scarce and costly resources are therefore taken up
attending cases many of which could be dcah with much less expensively by
GPs. Further, there is no incentive to economise on scarce resources in
availing of in-l)atient care, since the l)atient does not have to bear any ot: the
cost. What is now seen as the over-emphasis on hospital care and insufficient
attention to primary and preventive care built into modern health care
systems is thereby reinforced. Charges, appropriately structured, could
change the incentives facing patients so that they have an incentive to go to
hospital only if referred, and to minimise time spent as an in-patient.
It is noteworthy that Tussing (1985), writing abont the h’ish health
services in the early 1980s before the impetus for charges had gathered
momentnm internationally, highlighted the financial incentives facing
patients at that time which promoted the inappropriate use of care. Those
with medical card coveh who were entitled to fi-ee GP and hosl)ital care, had
no incentive to use the former rather than the latter, but these were not his
main concern. Instead, he emphasised the fact that the rest of the population
had to pay for GP care but were entitled to fi’ee public hospital out-patient
services. They therefore had a significant incentive to go straight to hospital
level, I)ypassing the GP and the referral system. Furthermore, those in
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l~ntiilenlent Category II and those with VI-II cover had virtually complete
cover from the state or the VHI |’or hospital in-patient care. He saw these
financial incentives as playing an important part in promoting inefficiency in
tile use of services, and recommended that tile), be altered.
This analysis formed part of the backdrop to the 1987 decision to
introduce charges for users of public hospital out-patient and in-patient
facilities who did not have medical card cover, l-towevel, the policy adopted
differed in important respects from that recommended by "russing. He
argued that the balance of user costs between GP and laospital-based care for
those not entitled Io medical card cover needed to be altered, but this was to
be done not onl)’ b)’ charging for hospital-based care but by making GP care
available fi-ee of charge to tile entire i)opulation. In the event, there was no
attempt to reduce the cost of GP care Ibr those outside Categor), I: policy
concentrated entirely oil introducing charges for hospital out-patient and in-
patient care.
Given the level of the charge for out-patient care, this has not in fact
been stfft’icient to eliminate the financial incentive to use hospital out-patient
and emergency departments rather than the GP as first point of contact. The
charge for an out-i)atient visit was initially £10 for the first visit with a
particular condition and no charge for sttbsequent visits with that condition,
and is now simply £6 for each visit. For a visit to the GP, those without
medical cards curreiatl), pay between £15-20 depending on the area and the
doctor. There is thus still a substantial gaI) between the price of these two
options tot someone seeking health care. There ma), often be longer waiting
times and [)erhaps higher travel costs associated with the laosl)ital-based
option, but these may not outweigh the significant difference in the ’basic
price in favour of going straight to hospital. While evidence on the extent to
which people actuall), do b)’pass the GP is limited, this plaenonaenon has been
seen as a problem for a number of years and continues to attract attention.26
While bringing about some alteration in the I)alance of financial incentives,
charges as currentl), structured have not provided a solution. Not only is
there a substantial remaining differential in price in favour of going straight
to hospital, but the patient who does go to the GP first and is then referred
26 For example, it w:ls secn as ;i problenl by GPs sula’eyed by the I)ublin I-lospilal Initi:ltk’c Group,
al)l)ointed b)’ the Minister tol" I-le~llth to examine the opcl’ation of Dublin hosl)iials (scc Third
Report. 1991. p. 90) and has been discussed rcgtd:lrly between GPs and Ihe I)cpm’nnlent of Health
inl reviews of the GMS scheme. While app:lrenul)’ most common in accident and emen’genc)’, it
al)l)c:lrs Ihat some people (Io also nllcn(I Otit-i):tticllt clinics without a refcrl’~tl letter [’rom their GP.
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on will have to pay at both stages. The total cost could then be as muela as £25
instead of the £6 out-patient charge. User charges in h’eland so far are
tkerefore likely to have had limited success in promoting the use of the
referral system, one of the main channels tlarough which they are seen as
(potentially) promoting efficiency.
As far its making people consciotts of the cost of hosl)ital in-patient care is
concerned, the charges currently in place are also likely to have limited
impact. They do not apply to those who have medical card covet" and, for the
most parK, will be covered by the VHI Ior those with health insurance.27 tLs a
result, they will impact directly on less than one-third of tile population. In
addition, there is an annual maxinlunl pa),ment of£200, so that even for that
one-third the charge will often not apply to the "marginal night" in hospital.
The charges as structnred are therefore unlikely to have had a major impact
on incentives: while hospital stays have I)ecn falling significantly in length in
recent years, this is once again primarily a supply-side ratker than a demand-
led phenomenon. The pressures on hospitals facing tighter budgetary
allocations appear to have been the main force I)ehind falling length of stay,
with the relatively low pel’-night charges playing at most a minor role. (As far
<as insured patients are concerned there are powerful incentives to prolong
in-patient stays rather than switch to home nnrsing, since the VHI will
generally cover the cost of the former but not the latter.)
While efficiency considerations have loomed large in tile research and
policy literature and undoul)tedly played a part in tile decision to introduce
charges for pul)lic health services in the h-ish case, policy has not been
consistent in this regard. A deep-seated ambiguity is revealed by the fact that,
in the face of the reaction to the introduction of charges, the Minister of
Health encouraged the VHI to set Kip special low-cost health insurance
schemes which would cover these charges. This is, of course, understandable
fi’om tile point of view of concern about equity and ability to pay, but - to the
extent that people buy that insurance - comprehensively ttndermines the
intpact of.the charges on the incentives facing patients, and thtts one of tile
main efficiency argttments made for charges in the first place.
27 This is the case for the in-patient charge bul nol generally for the out-p:ttient one, since only
those who spend over the annu~ll deductihle or have the special policy designed Io cover all the
charges will he reimbursed for the latter.
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5.3 Cha’rges and l3fficiencO, in Provi.~’ion of Health Services
:ks well as changing the incentives facing patients, proponents argue that
charges can help to improve efficiency ill tile delivery of health services by
altering tile incentives for those providing tile care - primarily doctors and
adnlinistrators. Where charges are levied and the remuneration of tile
individual provider depends on the amount collected, there is a direct
incentive to attract and treat nlore paLienLs. This link between cllarges and
reimbursement could be nlade simply by allowing tile provider keep a
pro]3ortion of tile revenue raised, or througb bonuses or otbel" nlechanisms.
Where the revenue collected does not affect the renluneration of tile
individual provider but some or all is retained in tile hospital or bealtll
centre, there will still be all incentive to maxinfise i’eventle f1"OIll charges so
the proceeds can be plouglled back into inlprovenlenLs in tile facility in lernls
of staffing, equipment and working conditions. To tile extent that those
delivering heahll care derive satisfaction not only from their own
renluneration and working conditions but also fi’onl the quality of the service
riley can provide, they will also be motiwtted to raise revenue through charges
in order to be able to inlprove tbat quality. Apart altogether fi’onl improving
efficiency, those working in the healtb services nlay need IO see some results
fi’onl raising revenue through charges if they are to be motivated to collect it
in the first place.
FOl" these reasons, advocates of cbarges tend to enlpllasise the
inlportance of retention of some or all of the revenue raise¢l tbrottgb fees at
tile point where they are collected. The nature of tile incentives to providers
produced 13}, charges and retention need to be analysed carefully, thotzgh.
The incentive may be to maxinlise throughput rather than quality of care, for
example. A doctor or bospital le~3,ing charges pet" patient and keeping sonae
or fill of the revenue will maxinlise tlleir financial rett]rn (at least in the sbort
run) by treating as nlany patients as possible and mininlising tile tinle given
Io each. ~,A, qlere a hospital keeps some of tile revenue fi’Onl per-night cllarges,
on the otber hand, the incentive may be to lengthen patient stays since tile
Ireatment cost per patient usually then falls. ~’.¥bere there is a cllarge for
prescription medicines, the incentive may effectively work to promote over-
prescribing ratber tban efficiency. For these reasons, given tile power of
providers in influencing patients’ decisions, payment on the basis of fee-per-
service has long been regarded with suspicion 13), nlany in the health area.
Indeed, these concerns led to the reinlbursenlent systenl for doctors treating
Category I patients in Ireland being altered recently fi’om fee-per-service to
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(principally) a capitation basis. The incentives to providers are of central
importance in influencing both tile quality of care and tile rate of expansion
of bealtb spending. ~qlel’e tile objective is to maximise the benefits fi’om
health spending wbile controlling tile growth in that spending, depending
on the nature of the link charges can in fact affect provider incentives
adversely. Once again, the special natnre of both tile commodity and tile
objective in the case of health care need to be kept to tile forefi’ont.
These considerations with respect to provider incentives and charges are
somewhat academic in tile h’ish context at present, though, since there is in
fact no link between providers and the cbarges for public health services. All
tile revenue raised fi’om these charges goes to tile Department of Health,
none is retained at tile bospital wbere tile), are collected, and neitber tile
fnnds available to the hospital nor tile position of those providing tile service
is directly affected. While tile total funds available to tile Department of
Health may be increased (if there is not an offsetting reduction in the
Exchequer allocation), the impact this has on tile budget of a particular
hospital is so small and indirect that it is not likely to affect incentives.
5. 4 Charges and Efficiency: Conclusionz"
As tile), are currently structured, cbarges for users of public health
services in h’eland are unlikely to yield the efficiency gains which proponents
see as one of their central justifications. Since they apply only to those
without medical card cover, over one-third of tbe population - who are
relatively intensive users of tile health services - are unaffected. For the rest
of the population the cost of seeking GP care is still significantly higber tban
the charge for a hospital out-patient visit, so there is still an incentive to
bypass the referral system and go straight to hospital. The public hospital in-
patieni charge will often be covered by health insurance, and even where the
patient pays tile charge it is unlikely to have a major impact on marginal
decisions about tile length of hospital stays, where the patient often has
relatively little say anyway. Since providers and hospitals do not retain any of
the revenue raised through charges, tile incentives facing then~ :-ire
un~fffected.
If tile cttrrent levels and stroctttre of charges are tmlikely to yield major
efficiency gains, one option is clearly to increase tbeir levels, widen their
scope, and restructure tbenl vet’), sttbstantially. To promote the use of the
appropriate level of care, this could invoh,e, for example, raising out-patient
charges for those outside Category I so that they exceed the cost ofa GP visit,
whicb would represent about a three-fold increase. Consideration would also
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have to be given to introclucing some charges for those with medical card
cover, since otherwise a substantial proportion of utilisation would not be
affected. If GP care remained fi-ee of charge for this group, a lower out-
patient charge than for the rest of the population would still provide an
incentive to use the GP instead. Some charge for prescription medicines for
the Category I population, already discussed in Chapter 4, would also have to
be considered. To provide an incentive to minimise the nunlber and length
of hospital stays, the per-night charge cotllcl be raised significantly, tlae annual
maximum annual payment could be abolislacd, and instlrallce cover for the
charges for those with VHI could be reduced (by the use of co-payments, i.e.,
the patient pays a proportion of the charge) or eliminated. Hospitals could
be allowed to keep some or all of the reventte raised.
First of all, the result would be a very substantial increase in the
importance of out-of-pocket payments, and in the cost of healtla care for
those who spend time in hospital. The objections to such a course fi’om an
equity point of view, to be discussed in the next chapteh are such that it is
unlikely to he considered an attractive option. Even from an efficiency
perspective, though, experience elsewhere does not suggest that this is a
particularly productive route to take. Other means may be available to
promote the same objectives more directly and effectively, involving either a
reduced but reoriented role for charges or by other mechanisms entirely.
To promote the use of the referral system, for example, a simple by-pass
charge, applying only to those who go straight to hospital and are not
considered emergency cases, could suffice. Those who are referred by their
GP or need out-patient care after an in-patient stay would not pay the fee.
The charge would have to be substantial to outweigh the cost ofa GP visit, of
the order of£20 or more: an alternative would be for hospitals simply to refer
such patients back to the GP without treatment. (All dais prestqgposes the
availability of the GP even at unsociable hours, without which trying to
promote the use of the referral system is problematic as an aim in the first
place.) Incentives to limit the length of hospital stays where appropriate, and
encourage day surgery rather than in-patient stays, may be better directed at
providers and hospitals than patients. While linking rewards/budgets to
revenue from charges is one way to affect incentives for providers and
hospitals, such incentives can equally well be altered without charges. For
e×amp]e, C, Ps in the UK are now rewarded for reaching targets for the
proportion of their patients immunised or screened, although the patient
faces no charge. Similarly, hospital budgetary allocation procedures can be
designed to reward efficiency, however defined, with little or no reference to
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the initial source of the funding.
Improving efficiency in the delivery of health services in order to meet
growing demands while controlling health sl)ending is the central challenge
facing health care systems in the developed world. Because of the nature of
health care and the partictdar features of the market for that commodity,
having users pay for the service at the l)oint of delivery is not likely to have
the impact on efficiency that it would in other markets. If promoting
efficiency in use and provision of laealth services is a central aim of charges
for public heahla services in Ireland, the design of the current structure of
charges fails to adequately reflect that ol)jectivc. Any restructuring will also
have to take equity considerations into account, however, and it is to these
that we turn in the next chapter.
Chaptel" 6
t-II£’ALTI-I CI-IARGES AND EQUITY IN II~.I.ANL1
6. 1 hzlroductio~z
~.’~tbatevel" about the trier’its of intl’oducing o1" expanding charges for
public heahh services fi’om an efl]ciency and expenditure containment point
of vie~g the ~’esistance to charges laas been driven primarily by concerns about
equity. In this chapter we consider tile nature of those conce~’ns, and assess
the current role and strttcture of charges in Irelancl, and different directions
fo~" reform, fi’om an equit), perspective. We begin in Section 6.2 with a
discussion of why and laow health care is widely regarded as different fi’om
other commodities fi’om an equity point of view, and the implications for
assessing the fairness or otberwise of financing and deliver), systems. Section
6.3 deals witl~ the potential Ibm" charges to act as a barrier to access to health
care for the pooK, and the issues which arise if the poor are to be exempted.
Section 6.4 looks at the b~’oader question of bow charges might affect the
distribution of access to and use of health services througbotxt the
dist~’ibution. Section 6.5 turns to equit), in the financing of health care and
how charges rcl~lte to other sources of financing fi’om this point of view.
Finall)’, the conclusions are brotlglat together.
6. 2 Equity and Health Care
In a market economy, the distribution of goods and services among
individuals and households is determined pl"imarily by the distribution of
ptH’chasing powe~" - the distribt~tioll of inconle al’id wealth. Govel’nlllelllS
wishing to alter the distrlbtltion of consumption can use the tax and social
welfare systems to alter ihe way in wlaich command over resources is
distributed. Income transfer" safety-nets are designed to provide for a basic
level of consumption of, for example, food or clotbing, l-lowever,
governments in sucb economies also intervene directly in altering the
distribution of ce~’tain goods and sex’vices, and the most prominent of these
are health care and education. This partly retlects the fact that markets fo~"
tbese commodities will not operate in tile way that other markets do, for a
variety of reasons, so that intervention can be justified on efficiency
grounds.28 l~robabl)’ the more important reason, though, is that these
28 See, for exanlple, B:~rr’s (1987) :l*l:lly.sis of the rczl.~ons ~’h)’ in:li’kct.s ti:~r health c;u’e ;rod educ;ltion -
unlike hot*sing - I~lil 1o conlbrm c~’cll approxim:ttely to the conditions required for competitive m:~*-ket.~ to
opel~lte efneiently, t%.~ f:lr :l~; health c;u’e is concel’lled, tile Cenll~ll i~ICIOI’S [11"~ Ihe i’eli~lnce of COllStllllel’$ OI1
ix*rovlders fbr glli(litnce :ll~?lut :llX*pl’l)pl’i~lle C;ll’e, the ilnCel’lilillly ~ll~llll Ihc int;idcnce of [Ihles$ ;111(I tile Ilced
Ibr pooling of risks, :llxcl the limited competition I:.~:tween suppliel’s.
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partictdar commodities are distinctive in ternls of public attitucles as regards
eq u i ty.
Precisely how they are distinctive, what public attitudes are in this
respect, is debatable and much debated. As far as health care is concerned,
McLachlan and Maynard, for example, conclude that "equit); like beauty, is
in the eye of the beholder" (1982, p. 520). This seems to overstate the extent
of divergence in views, though. Judging fi’om public policy statements, a
commitment to the notion that all citizens should have access to health care
is very widel), shared, in developing and developed countries. In many
cotlntries, thougla, this is taken further: it is seen as a goal that access to and
receipt of heath care should depend on need, rather than on ability to pay
(Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, el al., 1992). In the h’ish case, the discussion
document Iqealth the Wider Dime~sions issued by the Department of Health in
1986 stated that equity "is taken to relate to the distribution of availahle
health services over the population on the basis of need" (i). 18). The
Commission on Health Funding, in its 1989 report, took as a starting-point
the definition of equity in terms of ensuring "equal access to and utilisation
of [necessary] services ..... for patients with similar needs, regardless of tlaeir
geographical location or ability to pay" (p. 66). Presenting the aim in terms
of equality of access to "necessary" or "adequate" health care recognises that
some limits inevital)ly have to be placed on the services inchided.
Even if these broad goals are widely accepted, there undoubtedly exist
significant differences in interpretation,2g and different people would wish to
see the implications followed throttgh in policy terms to differing degrees.
This reflects, intm" alia, the tilct that there may be a conflict with other societal
goals. For example, ensuring that health care was distributed purely on the
basis of need rather than ahility to pay inight involve restrictions on the
freedom of the rich to use their resources to btty better health care than the
rest of the population. A I)alance therefore has to be struck, with the
Commission on Health Funding, lor example, concluding that it would not
be acceptable to deny people recourse to pri~-ate laealth care if they wished to
pay for it (but that there should be no public subsidy). At a milaimum,
though, there does appear to be quite widespread sltpport for the notion that
need rather than ability to pay should be the major influence on the
distribution of heahh care, and a corresponding unease with income-I)ased
29 For cXaml)lc, Ihe rcccnl exchange bclwecn Culycr, Van Dool’sl:lci" and Wagst:lff (1992a,b) :lnd
Moone)’, I)on:lldson and Gerard (1991,19921 Ibcuses on whether equality of access or eqttality of
use of se~a’iccs is the aim commonly implied by policy st:~tementx.
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differences in speed of access to, o[" quality of, care.
±~ far as []nancing is conce]’lacd, public attitudes towards health care as
reflected in official policy statements also clearly see it as different fi’om other
commodities f’ot" which payment is simply related to consumption. The most
common formulation is that contributions towards tile fimding of health cat’e
should be based on ability to pay rather than use. Van Doo]’slaer, Wagstaff
and Rutten (1993), for example, document that this is tile case ill policy
statements for 8 out of the 9 Eu]’opean countJ’ies covered in tile stud),. Again,
h’eland fits neatl), into the general pattern. Hertllh The Wider DimensioT~,~ stated
that people should be asked to contribute to the cost of health services on
tile basis of their financial means. The Commission on Health Funding also
stated that payment should be accoJ’ding to means. Again, there is scope fo]"
divergence in interpretation and fo]" disagreement about whether a particula]"
distributional outcome is "f,lir" in these te]’ms.
6..3 Charges, Equit); and Access
Chal’ging for health care gives ]’ise to concerns from an equity
perspective first and foremost because charges may act as a ba~’]’ie~" to access
for the poor. While the demand for health care appears to be relatively price-
inelastic, tile evidence is that price is an important dete]’minant of utilisation
of medical care and that introducing or increasing charges, in itself, will
~’eduee utilisation.30 Thet’e is also some evidence that low-income households
are most likely to be discouraged - tile poor are more price-sensitive than the
]’ich.31 (Even where care is available fi’ee of charge, time and travel costs and
l~erhaps also loss of earnings will be associated with obtaining care.) Charges
will discourage some of those who would use fi’ee health services, unless tile
quality or availability of the service improves markedly when charges are
imposed or increased. In a developing count]’), context, tile argument is
oftez~ advanced that charges can p]’ovide the basis fol" such an improvement,
and that demand may actually then increase ]’ather than fall when charges
al’e introduced because, for" example, health facilities will be able to purchase
medicines. In tile OECD countries, though, where Health services ave at a
30 This is cerl:linly the c:lse in developed countries, for which see, for ex:maple, M:tnning el oL
(1984), Colle anti Grossmnll (1978), van de Ven (1983) ;rod ~Xtooncy (1989). For developing
colmtries the position is less cle:lr. Some studies have flailed to find signific~lnt price efrecLs on
dum:lnd for he:llth c:lrc (see, t~)r ex;lmple, Hellet" 1982, Akin, e.t aL, 1986), bilL other stlch ;Is Gert]er
;111c1 ’,~tll der G;l;tg (1990) do lind price to be ;in im}~orl;lnl cleleI’minilnl :tt~td conc]ude th;~t nlodel
mis-specifc;ttion is the nl;lin rt~:is£)l’l wh}, othel" studies did 11ol do so.
31 ~e, fi)r example. Newhot~se. ~Xlanning and Mol’l’is ( 1981 ), Gel-tier and ~ln den" Gaag (1990).
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much more advanced stage and other sources of financing are available, it is
hard to see charges having such an impact on services that utilisation would
not be discouraged.
Estinmting the likely impact of charges per se on demand in the h’ish case
is problematic. The most comprehensive estimates of the relationship
I)etween price and demand for health care, fl’om the USA, are drawn fi’om an
ambitious and expensive controlled randomised experiment conducted by
the Rand Corporation over it five-year period and invoh, ing over 20,000
individuals (Manning, el aL, 1984). In the h’ish case, we can only look at how
utilisation varies across different individuals mad households at a particular
point in time, using cross-section data fi’om the ESRI 1987 Survey of llacome
Distribution, Poverty and Use of State Services or the C80’s Household
Budget Surveys. While there is some variation in price across these
households, the nature of this variation makes it difficult to distinguish the
influence of price fi’om other factors likely to affect demand. This is I)ecause
prices differ (for the most part) only between households with and without
insurance and between those entitled to free pul)lic health cltre and those
who have to pay for some services. Thtts, Nolan (1991, 1993b) analysed the
GP visiting behaviour of the ESRI 1987 sample and fotnld that even when
factors such as age, sex, location, and health status were taken into account
there was a significant difference between those who had to pay for care and
those who did not - those with medical card cover and thus fi’ee care had
more visits. However, not all this difference can be atuibuted to the impact of
price on demand, for two reasons. The first is that there may be other
differences between those witla/without medical card covet" which have not
been included in the model but would affect the demand for care - perhaps
most in~portantly, the indicators of healtla status included may not adequately
reflect the greater ill-health experienced by those on low incomes. Secondly,
as Tussing emphasised, the fact that (up to 1989) GPs treating medical card
patients were paid on a fce-per-service basis I)ut patients did not have to pay
could have contribttted to some indttcement of demand by providers, v~qlile
Tussing’s results mad tim analysis of the 1987 survey both suggest that price
has a role in influencing demand for care, they do not permit a confident
prediction of the magnitude of the effects.
It is not disputed, though, that charges do generally discourage utili-
sation and that the poor must be protected. The usual approach of those
advocating charges is that the poor can be exempted. Howeveh the impact
on incentives of targeting the poor via means-testing has become a nl.f.tjor
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issue in recent years, both in the research literature and in public policy
debates. Where social security cash transfers and perhaps also assistance with
housing or odter needs are targeted on a means-tested basis, the incentive to
take up employment or to work harcler can be eroded, leading to
unemploynmnt and poverty "traps". Having charges for health services with
means-based exemptions will exacerbate these problems, whereas much of
the effort in reforming tax and social security systems currently is directed
towards improving work incentives. In the Irish case, tile fact that tile
unemployed or those in work with incomes low enough to entitle them to
fi’ee GP care and prescription medicines will lose this entitlement if they
rettlrtl to work or increase their earnings has been seen as an important
eontribtltor to Stlch "traps". Some estimates of replacement rales for
illustrative household types, intended to show the relationship between net
income when ill and out of work, have included a tentative figure for the
value of these medical card entidemcnts, based on family size and the likely
number of GP visits and prescriptions ill a year and what these would cost if
the income ceiling is exceeded and medical card cover lost. The impact on
labour supply behaviour has not been reliably estimated and tile overall
significance of these traps, for example for tile level or composition of
unemlgloyment
, 
is unclear. What is clear, is that increasing the role of charges
for health while exempting the poor contributes to worsening these traps,
and would probably be of greatest significance for those with large numbers
of dependent children.
This is the approach which has in Fact been adopted with tim public
hospital charges introduced here in 1987. These apply only to people without
medical card cover, thus widening the gap in entitlements between those in
Category I and the rest of tile population. With the subsequent abolition of
Category I11, the entitlement structure now simply distinguishes those with
medical card cover, who are entitled to ftdl fi-ee public health care, and the
remainder of the population, who have to pay for GP care, prescription
medicines, and the "new" charges for public hospital out-patient and in-
patient care. Any further expansion in the role of charges while relying on
exemption to protect tile poor will add to the significance of this means-
tested entitlement and furdler exacerbate tile problelns created.
6. 4 Charges, Equit3; and Utilisation
Apart from the problem of access to health care for tile poor, the
broader question of how charges might affect the distribution of access to
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and use of health services tlaroughoot the disu’ibution is also of relevance
fl’om an equity perspective. We have seen that the view that "need" rather
than ability to pay should be the main determinant of access to and use of
heahh care appears to be a widely-held one. Against that background, even if
tile poor were exempted, charging for care could be seen as increasing the
importance of ability to pay throughout the rest of the distribution.
Proponents of charges, on the other hand, argue that the middle and upper
income groups often "capttwe" most of the benefit fi’om fl’ee services, and
that charges can improve equity by making them pay, thus providing
resources which can be used to improve services for the poor.
In developing countries, it is certainly often the case that the relatively
well-off benefit disproportionately from public health services, because most
public spending usually goes on serxfces in urban rather rural areas. In the
OECD countries, though, the more common pattern is that the benefits from
public health spending tend to be much more evenly spread throughout the
income distribution (see, for example, Saunders and Klau, 1985). While
those in the bottom half of the distribution generally benefit most fi’om
public health spending, that is where the elderly, who are the most intensive
users of health services, are predominantly located. In the Irish case, studies
which have allocated the "benefit" fi-om public spending on health services
among households on the basis of utilisation patterns and the cost of
providing different types of care show very much dais type of distribution.
Rottman and Reidy (1988) used the 1980 Household Budget Survey and
Nolan (1991) used the 1987 ESRI survey for this purpose. Nolan used
reported utilisation for each individual, whereas Rottman and Reidy had to
rely on averages for each age/sex group.) Ranking households on the basis
of equivalent disposable income, Nolan (1991) found that about 30 pet" cent
of allocated public health spending went to the bottom 20 pet- cent of
households, two-thirds went to the bottom half of the distribution, and only 7
per cent went to the top 20 per cent.32 "~.~,qaile expenditure on GP care and
prescription medicines for Category 1 is the most concentrated in the bottom
half, two-thirds of public hospital spending also goes to that part of the
disu’ibution and it dominates the total.
In h’eland, as in other OECD countries, it is not then the case that most
of the beneft fi’om public heahh spending is "captured" by the well-off. Not"
is it the case, that the benefits are entirely concentrated at the bottom of the
distribution. This is by design rather than by accident: public hospital care is
32See Nolan (1991),Table 12.4, p. 169.
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intended to be available to all and is in fact used b), people throughout the
distribution. (In the upper income deciles a large proportion pay to have in-
patient care in private or senti-private accounmodation in public hospitals but
still benefit to some extent fi’om public spending, tbough that benefit is
difficult to quantify precisely.) In the UK, similar+l),, studies have shown that
public expenditure on the National Health Service goes on people
througbout the distribution but with tbe bottom half receiving more than
half the benefit. This is consistent with tbe notion that the objective of public
spencling on health is mucb broader than simply ensuring access to services
fox+ the poor: by making services available to ever)’one irrespective of income,
the NI-IS aims to pronmte access and use on the basis of need rather than
ability to pa),. To the extent that the)’ act as a barrier to access whicb
diminishes in importance as income rises, charges (even exempting the
poor) such as those now operating in h’isb public hospitals increase tbe
importance of income vis-d-vis need as a determinant of use. Their
significance in tbis regard depends on how much of a barrier the), constitute
at current levels, which is difficult to assess with the itaformation available: the
most recent household survey with information on utilisation was carried ottt
before or just as the charges were being introduced, so it is not possible to
use such data to assess how utilisation patterns have been affected.
Concerns about equity in the distribution of heahh care relate not only
to how public spending on health is disu’ibuted, but to tbe overall use of
health services, whether publicly or privately financed on" delivered. Here less
information is available internationally, but the recent cross-country study by
van Doorslaeu, Wagstaff and Rutten (1993) has tried to assess the extent to
which income influences the use of bealth services in various OECD
countries. This study took as point of departure that equity in this comext
implies that those in equal need of healdl care should be treated the same,
irrespective of income. Based on household samples for each counu’y and
applying a cotmnon metbodology, the relationsbip between tbe value of
health care received (in tel’nls of imputed expenditure), "need" as proxied by
age, sex anad indicators of bealth status, and income was examined. The
results tentatively suggested that there was in this sense inequity favouring the
better-off in a numl)er of the countries studied, including the USA, the UK
and Spain. h+eland was inehtded in this study, with results fully reported in
Nolan (1993a), and no pronounced inequity in deliver), of health care was
found. The indicators of laeahh status available were crude and limited,
particularl), in the irisb case. However, tbe stud), does suggest that on a cross-
country basis there is 11o simple one-to-one correspondence between a
fi0 CHARGING FOR PUBI.IC I-II~kl.T]-I SERVICES IN IRELAND
country’s financing or delivery system and tile clegree of inequity ill delivery.
Tbis is best illustrated by tile thet that some inequity was found in tile UK,
where public cover is universal and conll~rehensive, as well as ill tile USA
where the private sector is so important. Looking at an individual country
and predicting tile impact of an increased role tot" charges, tbougb, it is once
again difficult to see how the result can be anything other than an increase in
the importance of inconle as opposed to need as a determinant of use.
6.5 Cha’tges and Equity in Fbzand’ltg
So far we have been concerned in this chapter with equity ill access to
and use of health services. Many people have strong views not only about
access and use, but also about fairness in tile financing of health care, and
charges also give rise to concerns fi’om that perspective. Compared with
alternative sonrces of revenue, tbey are seen as likely to be regressive. If one
starts fl’om the premise that health care ought to be financed on tile basis of
ability to pay, then this is an undesirable feature of charges irrespective of
their impact on utilisation.
Stndies which have attempted to assess the degree of equity in tile
finance of health care across countries and across different sources of
revenue bave taken this premise as their point of reference. For example
Hurst (1985) compared US, Canadian and British systems of health
financing, and Gott.schalk, Haveman and Wolfe (1989) compared US, British
and Dutch systems fl’om this standpoint. The most comprehensive sucb study
is again the recent one by van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten (1993),
covering 10 OECD countries including Ireland. This found that, using
standard asstunptions about incidence, taxes are typically a progressive means
of raising revenue, with direct taxes generally progressive and indirect taxes
regressive - consistent with the usual picture provided by studies of taxation
and distribution. Social insul-ance, by contrast, is usually a regressive method
of raising revenue, often because contributions are subject to a ceiling. In
conntries where it plays a major role, private health insurance is also
regressive, indeed usually even more so. "~qlere private insurance plays only a
subsidiary role and is taken out mainly by tile better-off, as in tile UK, The
Netherlands and h’eland, it is currently progressive: however, to tile extent
tbat fnrther expansion can only come about as a result of persons in tile
middle and lower income groups also taking otlt insurance, snch expansion
would make it less progressive. Out-of-pocket payments were generally found
to be a regressive form of bealth care finance. Indeed in predominantly tax-
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financed systems, these payments are generally the only regressive element in
the financing system, apart from indirect taxes.
The results for the different sources of health financing in Ireland (again
fully reported in Nolan 199.’3a) are quite consistent with this general pattern.
Direct taxes were tbund to be quite progressive, indirect taxes regressive, anti
total taxes marginally progressive. Social insurance contributions, in this
instance the Health Levy element, were mildly progressive, because aldaough
there was a ceiling al)ove which no further contril)utions were levied, very
little was paid by the bottom two (equivalent) income deciles because they
contained very few earners. (The income ceiling for the Health Le~’ element
was abolished in 1991 so it currently al)plies to all earnings, which would
imply a greater degree of progressivity.) Health insurance is progressive, as
already noted, because it is mostly taken out by upper and middle income
households, and out-of-pocket payments are regressive. Weighting each
source by its importance in the overall financing of health care, the su’ucture
as a whole (in 1987) was found to be slightly progressive but close to
proportional.
The ct’oss-country comparative data for OECD countries lead van
Doorslaer, Wagstaff, et al., to conclude that a greater emphasis on Otlt-of-
pocket payments in these countries is likely to make health care financing
less progressive or more regressive. In the h’ish case, these payments are
currently regressive and this conclusion applies. This is the case even thougla
here, as in some of the other countries in the study, those on low incomes are
accorded special treatment. In the Irish case, those qualifying for a medical
card do not have to pay for GP care or prescription medicines, which make
up a significant element in out-of-pocket expenses for the remainder of the
population. None tlae less, on balance these payments over the distril)ution as
a whole are regressive, on the basis of conventional summary progressivity
indices. Simply exempting the poor is not sufficient to make these payments
a progressive source of financing.
There is no simple corresl)ondence between out-of-pocket payments and
charges for public health services, sillce the former include payments for
private care and the latter may be partly covered by instlrance. However, in
the h’ish case, it is probable that charges for public heahh services as
currently structured are regressive. They apply to about two-thirds of the
pol)ulation and are flat-rate rather than income-related, and those in the
middle of the income clistril)ution are more intensive users of pul)lic health
services and are therefore more likely to be subject to the charges than those
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towards the top. While health insurance is currendy progressive, expanding
its role in covering these charges does not offer a way around their
regressivity, since, as ah’eady noted, any such expansion will be into the
middle and lower income groups and will simpl), make insurance less
progressive. Not all the ahernatives are necessarily more progressive - for
example, increasing indirect taxation - but certainly compared with direct
taxation, or even increasing social insurance contributions, expanding the
role of charges is likely to move the h’ish system of health financing towards
less progressivity.
6. 6 CondusioTzs
Health care is generally seen as different to other commodities in terms
of equity. Heahh care is regarded as a right, and the notion that it should be
distributed primarily on the basis of need and financed primarily on the basis
of ability to pay is widely held. This has implications for the role of charges
for public health services, in terms of their impact on utilisation and on the
progressivity of health care financing. Charges may act as a barrier to access
to care for the poor, and exempting the poor fi’om charges via means-testing,
as is currently the practice in Ireland, can create other problems by
contributing to unemployment and poverty traps. Even where the poor are
exempt, charges increase the importance of abilit), to pay as opposed to need
in determining access to care. Out-of-pocket payments are generally a
regressive means of financing health care, and expanding their role is likely
to move the financing of health care in h’eland, which is currently mildl),
progressive, in the direction of less progressivity. The same is probably true of
charges for public health services as they are currently structured in h’eland,
whedaer covered by laealth insurance or paid out-of-pocket.
Chapter 7
HEALTH CHA R CES IN IHIEIJ-I ND: CONCLUSIONS
In h’eland, out-patient services and in-patient care in (public wards of)
public hospitals were provided fi’ee to mosl of Ihe population up to 1987. In
that ),eat" charges for out-patient services and a per-night charge for in-
patients in public hospitals were introduced, appl),ing to all those who did
not qualify for a medical card on tile basis of a means test. These charges
were increased in earl), 1993, and tile reaction was such that tile Minister for
Iqcalth set ttp a review body to examine how tile), should be structured.
People who do have medical card cover are also entitled to fi-ee General
Practitioner services and prescription medicines. As public expenditure on
providing these services, particularly tile drugs element, continues to rise
relativel), rapidly, tile question of whether some charge should be imposed
there has also been raised on occasion. Issues which arise in setting the level
of charges for private accommodation in public hospitals - which hav+ been
increased dramatically in recent years - also need to be addressed. The basis
and rationale for policy towards charging for public heahh services therefore
need to be examined ill h’eland, as ill man), othel- countries, and that has
been tile aim of this paper.
Proponents of heahh services charges argue that they can mobilise
resources for health, discourage unnecessary utilisation and thereb), help to
control costs, promote efficienc),, and enhance equity. This paper has
examined these arguments as the), appl), in an h’ish context, and assessed the
current structure of charges in that light. Without repeating tile discussion in
any detail, it is worth drawing out tile central conclusions from that anal),sis
in this final chapter.
(1) ~’~qlereas some developing countries do indeed appear to have little
realistic ahernative to user charges, other sources of health
financing which spread tile burden much more widely (taxation or
social instlrance) are available in a country like Ireland. While there
ma), be distortions and welfare costs associated with these sources,
charges also have costs. Tile case for an enhallced role for health
charges in h’eland cannot rely simply on the need to raise
l’esoul’ces: instead, tile costs and benel]ts o[: alternative sotll’Ces of
financing have to be assessed.
(2) Charges are a blttnt weapon for controlling tile growth of heahh
expendittlz’es, likely to deter not only "unnecessary" but also
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"necessary" care. Aggregate expenditure on health as a proportion
of GDP has been successfully restrained in the Irish case prinlarily
by Exchequer control over public spending, particularly hospital
budgets, though the impact on accessibility and quality of services is
not clear. Measures to control expenditure growth with least impact
on the benefits fi’om healtla care may be better directed at providers
and administrators rather that’* patients.
(3) Charges can provide an incentive for people to use the health
services more sensibly, in particular to follow the appropriate
referral systems. The current structure of charges in Ireland is
unlikely to be effective in doing so, though, since those liable to
out-patient charges still pay substantially more for a GP
consuhation, and those with medical card cover do not pay for
either. If penalising those who go straight to hospital is a central
objective, then a by-pass fee which does not apply to those who are
referred on by the GP wotdd give the appropriate incentive;
(4) Charges as currently constituted in Ireland are unlikely to
discourage use of (costly to provide) hospital in-patient care, since
very often they will be covered by insurance and there is, in any
case, an annual maximum payment, so tile patient will very often
not face a charge for the "marginal night". Greater use of co-
payments in insurance would be required to give the appropriate
incentive to patienls, but evidence from elsewhere suggests this is
not very effective anyway: decisions about length of stay and choice
of in-patient versus out-patient care are more in the hands of the
providers and adminisu’ators than patients.
(5) Since reventte raised by charges goes directly to the Department of
Health and does not directly affect the resources available to
providers and hospitals, they do not provide incentives for cost
control or greater productivity. While retention of some of the
revenue raised can alter the incentives for providers and hospitals,
this would not necessarily be in the direction desired. These
incentives can be altered by changing the way remulaeration and
hospital budget-setting are structured, whether charges are in place
ol" not.
(6) From an equity perspective, health care is generally regarded as a
right, and the notion that it should be distributed primarily on the
basis of need rather than ability to pay is widely held. Charges may
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act as a barrier to access to care for Lhe pool’, and exelnpting tile
poor fi’om charges via means-testing, as is currently the practice in
Ireland, can create other problems by contribttting to
unemploynlent and poverty traps. Even where the poor are exempt,
charges increase tile importance of ability to pay as opposed to
need in determining access to care.
(7) The view that health care should be financed primarily on the basis
of ability to pay is also widely held. Charges are probably a
regressive way of financing health care even when the poor are
exempt, aod expanding their role is likely to move the financing of
health care in Ireland, which is currently mildly progressive, in the
direction of less progressivity.
The persistence with which user charges for public health services have
been proposed in Canada, despite repeated rejection by policy-makers and
tile general public, leads Stoddart et aL (1993) to term them "zombies" which
refuse to remain buried. In Ireland, by contrasl, the case for charges has not
been properly debated bt~t they were introduced an}’way. On examination of
the al’gtlments and all assessnlent of tbe available evidellce, tile case for
charges proves to be for the most part a weak one. This highlights the need
for clarity about what user charges in the h’ish health services are actually
i’lleaFit to accomplish. Is the prill]ary objective to control costs, discourage
unnecessary utilisation, promote efficiency, enhance equity or simply raise
revenue? Since charges are ineffective and unnecessary for controlling costs
and as likely to discourage "necessary" as ~’unnecessary" use (which are often
difficult to distinguish even with hindsight), the case on cost control or
efficiency grounds is unconvincing. Most public hospital in-patient care
depends on tbe decisions of doctors rather than patients and in-patient
charges are often covered by irlstll’aJ1ce alld leave incelltives to patients
unaffected anyway, so they cannot be justified on efficiency grounds.
Discouraging "inappropriate" use of hospital out-patient services instead of
GP care could be achieved simply b)’ charging those who by-pass the GP and
are not "gelluine emergencies", rather than all users. From a equity
perspective, financing public health care via taxation (or social insurat~ce)
means that, in broad terms, those on higher incomes pay a larger share than
others. With user fees, by contrast, the sick pay a larger share tban others,
and this remains true event when "the poor" are exempted.
The key issue remaining, then, is whether user charges are justified
simply as a means of raising revenue for the public heahh services. The
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argument can certainly be made tbat charges provide additional resources
and allow services to be improved. Wbat has to be considered, thouglL is the
costs involved and the alternatives. The costs are that some "necessary"
utilisation of services will be discouraged, and sick people will bc~.r a larger
sbare of the burden of financing. The ahernatives include raising additional
revenue from t~xation, diverting additional resources to hcaltb from other
areas of government spending, or improving tbe way the money currently
being devoted to health care is spent. There are costs associated with
increased taxation, and decisions about the level of taxation and the
appropriate balance of public spending between different areas are political
choices, l-loweveL it is worth highligbting evidence fi’om Ireland and other
countries which suggests tbat there is signilicant scope for improvement in
the wa), tbe health care system is structttred and managed and the way the
resoul’ces devoted to beahh care are spent.33 User cbarges can in some sense
be seen as a "soft option", postponing the need to address how to get better
value for money in tbe public beahb services.
Tbe point of departure fOl" atay assessment of current user cbarges lot
public beahh services in h’eland must therefore be tbat tbe basis and
justification for sucb charges need to be re-examined. Here it has been
argued tbat there is a case on efficiency grounds only for a cbarge on
"inappropriate" use of hospital otlbl)atient services by those who by-pass the
GP and are not genuine emergencies, although non-financial factors such as
GP availability which may inlltteoce dais choice also need to be considered.
Charges on users of out-patient services wbo bare been appropriately
referred, and in-patients, are simply a means of raising revenue which must
be assessed against the ahernatives. Even if the need for the revenue
provided b)’ charges is accepted, tbere is an alternative source, still within the
healtb area, which would ),ield considerably more while improving equity and
removing distortions. Tbe Exchequer currently forgoes about £45 million per
year in income t~LX tl3rougb the relief granted on health insurance premia.
This subsidises those witb insurance, mostly tbe better-off, in obtaining
private heahb care. (Callan (1991) shows bow the benefits are concentrated
in the upper parts of tbe income distribution.) Since the extension of
entitlement to public bospital care to the entire population with tbe abolition
of Entitlement Category 111 in 1991, tbe original justification for this relief-
namely the limited public entitlements of this group - no longer holds.
Indeed, it was on tbis basis that the Report of the Commission on Health
33 See for example Stoddart, et aL (1993); Report of the Commission on Health Funding (1987).
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Funding (1987) recommended th~tt the tax relief be phased out once the
entitlement structtu’e had been altered. The Commission on Taxation (1982)
also recommended that the relief be abolished as part of the broadenilag of
the tax base and removal of tax-induced distortions to incentives. While this
remains in place, it is particularly clift]cuh to accept the argument that user
chzlrges are the best o1" only w;.ly to increase (]le i-esotll’Ces availzlble to the
i)ublic health services.
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